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The Search for Moral Neutrality in Same-Sex Marriage
Decisions
Adam J. MacLeod*
I. INTRODUCTION
On May 15, 2008, the California Supreme Court in In re Marriage
Cases1 struck down California‘s conjugal marriage and domestic
partnership statutory scheme. On October 10, 2008 the high court of
Connecticut struck down that state‘s conjugal marriage and civil union
scheme.2 California and Connecticut thus joined Massachusetts and
became the second and third states, respectively, to create the institution
of same-sex marriage and to remove marriage between one man and one
woman (conjugal marriage) from its privileged place in state law. It is
instructive to examine a central premise underlying this project to
redefine ―marriage,‖ namely that the issue can be resolved on morally
neutral grounds of equality or autonomy. Rejections by high courts in
Massachusetts, California, and Connecticut of civil unions and domestic
partnerships, which provide to same-sex couples all or substantially all of
the rights and responsibilities of marriage, call this premise into question.
And the search for a morally neutral foundation for same-sex marriage
has turned out to be much more difficult than many scholars and jurists
anticipated.
Indeed, all three state high courts, which have created same-sex
marriage, have done so by dismissing the states‘ considered conception
of the meaning and purposes of marriage and by reading into the
institution their own purposes and fundamental requirements. Despite
their assertions that they were maintaining neutrality as between
competing moral conceptions of marriage, all three courts committed
themselves to morally partisan conceptions of marriage and on those
foundations held exclusively conjugal marriage unconstitutional. The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (―SJC‖) declared without
* Associate Professor, Faulkner University, Jones School of Law. I am indebted to my gifted and
gracious colleague, Andy Olree, for his insightful criticisms of and comments on an earlier draft.
Many thanks to the editors of the Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law for their able
and timely editorial work. All the errors are mine.
1. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).
2. Kerrigan v. Comm’r Pub. Health, —A.2d—, 289 Conn. 135 (Conn. 2008).
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explanation that the essence of marriage is not conjugality but rather
stable relationships. The California Supreme Court discerned a different
essence of marriage: individual self-fulfillment. The Connecticut high
court assumed without explanation that the essence of marriage is the
individual interest in having a family. On the grounds of their various
morally partisan conceptions of marriage, all three courts concluded that
same-sex intimacy is the equivalent of conjugal marriage, an historically
privileged institution, and is superior in its meaning and purposes to
other, common relational arrangements, such as friendship, political
affiliation, polyandry, and polygamy.
For four years prior to the California Supreme Court‘s decision, the
Goodridge decision3 of the Massachusetts SJC was the only judicial
rejection in the United States of exclusively conjugal marriage, the union
of one man and one woman in monogamous commitment. Nearly every
scholar who has commented on the Goodridge decision has taken as true
the proposition that the SJC‘s reasoning follows from some morally
neutral principle, such as equality or tolerance.4 However, the
scholarship has ignored a second marriage decision of the SJC, Opinions
of the Justices to the Senate,5 which the SJC decided only weeks after it
announced its holding in Goodridge. The legislative civil union proposal
that the SJC rejected in Opinions of the Justices would have treated
same-sex couples and conjugal, monogamous couples the same in every
regard except in terms of moral approbation.
In Goodridge and Opinions of the Justices, the SJC introduced a new
conception of marriage as a civil institution constructed around stable,
intimate relationships. It required the Commonwealth to lend its
approbation to relationships defined by sexual arrangements other than
conjugal monogamy. In this sense the SJC‘s same-sex marriage decisions
are perfectionist: they are legal pronouncements founded upon morally
partisan presuppositions intended to advance those presuppositions.6

3. Goodridge v. Dep‘t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
4. E.g., Mary L. Bonauto, Goodridge in Context, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2005);
Lawrence Friedman, The (Relative) Passivity of Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 14 B.U.
PUB. INT. L.J. 1 (2004); Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. L.
REV. 431 (2005).
5. Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004).
6. This article shall use the terms ―perfectionist,‖ ―perfectionism,‖ and ―non-perfectionist‖
in the sense that they are employed in moral and legal philosophy. Joseph Raz‘s definition is
appropriate: ―‗Perfectionism‘ is merely a term used to indicate that there is no fundamental
principled inhibition on governments acting for any valid moral reason, though there are many
strategic inhibitions on doing so in certain classes of cases.‖ Joseph Raz, Facing Up: A Reply, 62 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1153, 1230 (1989). For ―strategic inhibitions on‖ one might substitute, prudential
considerations against. Raz contrasts perfectionist liberalism with ―liberal doctrines of moral
neutrality.‖ Joseph Raz, Liberalism, Skepticism, and Democracy, 74 IOWA L. REV. 761, 782 (1989).
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Contrary to the SJC‘s assertions, the decisions do not follow from neutral
principles to which the aggregate of reasonable persons, with a plurality
of moral convictions, can assent.7
California‘s adventure in marriage review has fallen prey to the same
moral partisanship. Prior to In re Marriage Cases, California had both a
conjugal marriage statute and a domestic partnership law, which granted
to same-sex couples substantially all of the rights and obligations
attendant to marriage, much as the legislative proposal in Massachusetts
would have done.8 The California Supreme Court struck these laws
down, committing itself to the morally partisan proposition that gender is
irrelevant to the marriage question.9 The court denigrated those ―core
elements‖ of marriage, which the state had always considered central to
the meaning and purposes of the institution.10 It committed itself to the
moral claim that marriage is essentially a vehicle for advancing
individual fulfillment.11 In this manner the court injected into marriage
its own moral conception of which aspects of marriage constitute ―core
elements‖ and which ones can be disregarded.12 And on the basis of this
moral conception, the court concluded that conjugal marriage does not
deserve a place of special approbation in law.
Most recently, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that permitting
same-sex couples to participate in civil unions, which are afforded all the
rights and privileges of marriage, but not permitting them to marry,
offends the equal protection of the law.13 Like the Massachusetts and
A more particular definition of ―perfectionism‖ is that employed by Robert George.
―Perfectionism holds that one cannot hope to ascertain what is right (and wrong) for governments to
do—and thus what rights, as a matter of political morality, human beings have—without considering
what is for (and against) human well-being (including moral well-being) and fulfillment.‖ ROBERT
GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC MORALITY 161 (Oxford 1993).
I do not use the terms to refer to a mode or modes of constitutional interpretation. Thus, I
do not intend to enter the debate between Cass Sunstein and his critics over the relative merits of
―minimalism‖ and ―constitutional perfectionism.‖
7. Though defense of these decisions fails on morally neutral grounds, for the reasons set
forth below, one can attack (and many have attacked) the decisions on morally neutral grounds. One
morally neutral argument against the decisions is that they constitute judicial overreach. The
argument is that the Massachusetts Constitution is simply silent on the question how marriage ought
to be defined. On this view, even if the SJC‘s moral conception of human personhood and human
sexuality is correct, the SJC ought not to have incorporated its conception into law by judicial fiat.
Another morally neutral argument is that the decisions undercut respect for the rule of
law. For a version of this argument see William C. Duncan, Goodridge and the Rule of Law SameSex Marriage in Massachusetts: The Meaning and Implications of Goodridge v. Department of
Public Health, 14 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 42 (2004).
8. In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 675, 684–85 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
9. See infra Part IV.C.2.
10. See infra Part IV.C.1.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Kerrigan v. Comm’r Pub. Health, —A.2d—, 289 Conn. 135 (Conn. 2008).
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California high courts, the Connecticut court reached this conclusion by
tossing out the purposes for which the State of Connecticut had always
maintained a special place in its laws for conjugal marriage. It identified
its own purposes for the institution and then determined that same-sex
couples are similarly situated to conjugal couples for those purposes.14
Several years before state courts entered the fray, scholars on both
sides argued that moral neutrality is impossible on the question what
characteristics define ―civil marriage.‖ Dispute over the predicates of
marriage—including conjugality (spouses are of opposite sexes),
monogamy (spouses are two, no more and no less), non-consanguinity
(spouses are not related to each other), and age—is, according to Robert
George, who defends conjugal marriage,15 and Carlos Ball, who favors
same-sex marriage,16 an inherently moral dispute. Far from disproving
this claim of George and Ball, state courts have thus far failed to justify
removal of the conjugality requirement on morally neutral grounds. This
failure suggests a reason why the debate over the state same-sex
marriage decisions has stalled. Treating the marriage decisions as
exercises in moral neutrality renders productive discussion of the merits
of the decisions impossible for the simple reason that the decisions are
not, in fact, morally neutral.
Though judicial decisions creating same-sex marriage have failed to
produce morally neutral justifications, there exists a morally neutral
rational basis for leaving conjugal marriage laws in place. Courts remain
morally neutral when they acknowledge the rationality of legislatures‘
distinctions between self-evidently distinct relational arrangements—
conjugal monogamy, polygamy, same-sex intimacy, non-sexual
friendship—where legislatures have created distinct legal categories for
various types of relationships.
Part II of this article contrasts the non-perfectionist rhetoric of the
SJC‘s Goodridge decision with the SJC‘s perfectionist ambitions, made
manifest in the subsequent Opinions of the Justices, and explains why the
two decisions together cannot be understood as morally neutral rulings.
Part III explains why morally neutral principles of equality and
autonomy do not support the SJC‘s same-sex marriage decisions. Part IV
considers the judicial re-definition of marriage in California. It begins
with the decision of the California Court of Appeal in In re Marriage

14. Id. at 14–15.
15. See Robert P. George, Marriage and the Illusion of Moral Neutrality, in TOWARD THE
RENEWAL OF CIVILIZATION 114, 124–27 (T. William Boxx & Gary M. Quinlivan eds., Eerdmans
Pub. Co. 1998).
16. See Carlos A. Ball, Moral Foundations for a Discourse on Same-Sex Marriage: Looking
Beyond Political Liberalism, 15 GEO. L.J. 1871 (1997).
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Cases and that court‘s attempt to resolve the marriage issue in a morally
neutral manner. It then considers the perfectionist arguments made by
same-sex marriage advocates to the California Supreme Court, and
concludes with an examination of the California Supreme Court‘s moral
perfectionism. Part V examines the similar perfectionist project that the
Supreme Court of Connecticut undertook. Part VI examines a
perfectionist account of same-sex marriage that, while it fails to persuade
this author, renders the Massachusetts, California, and Connecticut samesex marriage decisions comprehensible. Part VII offers both morally
partisan and morally neutral rational bases for upholding states‘ conjugal
marriage laws. Part VIII briefly summarizes the findings of this piece.
II. THE MASSACHUSETTS DECISIONS
Before Goodridge, Massachusetts marriage law required as a
prerequisite to acquisition of a marriage license that the applicants be
members of opposite sexes. Furthermore, the law provided that any
marriage in which one or both partners were incapable of conjugal union
was voidable.17 In these and other ways, Massachusetts law approved of
committed, conjugal monogamy and distinguished it from other sexual
relationships. It accorded a special status to, and provided legal and
structural support for, the two-in-one-flesh communion instantiated in a
monogamous, opposite-sex marriage. In Goodridge the SJC eradicated
that special status by a one-vote margin.
Most commentators have read the Goodridge decision as an
application of the non-perfectionist principle that moral considerations
should not resolve the question how ―marriage‖ should be defined.18 The
SJC itself fostered this impression in Goodridge, taking pains to assert
that moral considerations and convictions did not resolve the question
before it.
Commentators have paid insufficient attention to the holding of the
SJC‘s Opinions of the Justices,19 which followed the Goodridge decision.
In that decision, a majority of the SJC rejected a proposal by the
Massachusetts General Court, the state legislature, to create civil unions
in response to the concerns the SJC had expressed in Goodridge.
Although the proposal would have resolved all of the Court‘s express,

17. Martin v. Otis, 124 N.E. 294, 296 (Mass. 1919); Smith v. Smith, 50 N.E. 933, 935 (Mass.
1898). Neither the SJC nor the Massachusetts legislature has addressed the effect of Goodridge upon
this provision.
18. See authors cited supra note 4.
19. Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 569 (Mass. 2004).
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ostensibly morally neutral concerns,20 it was nevertheless an insufficient
remedy for the ostensible injustice the Court identified in Goodridge.21
When read together, the majority opinion in Goodridge and the
subsequent Opinions of the Justices make clear that the SJC‘s marriage
doctrine is not morally neutral. Indeed, the decisions together are
unreasonable unless understood as judicial exercises in what some have
derided in other contexts as legislation of morality.
A. Non-perfectionist Rhetoric and Perfectionist Principle
In Goodridge, the SJC majority began its analysis by declaiming its
ostensible moral neutrality. It assured the reader of its mindfulness ―that
our decision marks a change in the history of our marriage law.‖22 It
recognized the ―deep-seated religious, moral, and ethical convictions‖
that underlie arguments on both sides of the question how ―marriage‖
ought to be defined and the question whether homosexual conduct is
moral or rather unworthy of persons who engage in it.23 It nevertheless
insisted, ―Neither view answers the question before us. . . . ‗Our [sic]
obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our [sic] own
moral code.‘‖24
Though nothing prohibited the SJC from examining in Goodridge
the moral reasons in favor of conjugal marriage, the majority did not
consider any. The SJC, employing the rational-basis test, cited the extant
standard that legislative enactments must ―bear[ ] a real and substantial
relation to the public health, safety, morals, or some other phase of the
general welfare.‖25 The absence of moral considerations in favor of
20. This is not to suggest that had the SJC accepted the General Court‘s civil union proposal,
its Goodridge decision would be capable of a morally neutral reading, only that the holding of
Opinions of the Justices precluded any reasonable morally neutral interpretation of Goodridge.
21. This lesson has direct application in California because the California ―[l]egislature has
passed landmark legislation providing substantially all the rights, responsibilities, benefits and
protections of marriage to same-sex couples who register as domestic partners.‖ In re Marriage
Cases, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 675, 684–85 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (citing CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 297–299.6
(West 2004)). Section 297.5(a) of the California Family Code provides:
Registered domestic partners shall have the same rights, protections, and benefits,
and shall be subject to the same responsibilities, obligations, and duties under law,
whether they derive from statutes, administrative regulations, court rules, government
policies, common law, or any other provisions or sources of law, as are granted to and
imposed upon spouses.
22. Goodridge v. Dep‘t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003).
23. Id.
24. Id. (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 559 (2003)).
25. Id. at 960 (quoting Coffee–Rich, Inc. v. Comm‘r Pub. Health, 204 N.E.2d 281, 287
(Mass. 1965)) (emphasis added).
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conjugal marriage in the majority‘s reasoning resulted both from the
Commonwealth‘s advocates failing to bring them up, and from the
majority‘s natural inclination toward one-column bookkeeping in terms
of moral considerations.
Notably, the rational bases that the
Commonwealth proffered in support of conjugal marriage did not
include any purely moral considerations. Instead, the Commonwealth
identified three prudential considerations that support the traditional
definition: ―(1) providing a ‗favorable setting for procreation‘; (2)
ensuring the optimal setting for child rearing, which the department
defines as ‗a two-parent family with one parent of each sex‘; and (3)
preserving scarce State and private financial resources.‖26 The
Commonwealth made no attempt to tie any of these prudential concerns
to the moral value of conjugal marriage.27
The majority, in passing, mentioned the arguments of some amici
curia that conjugal marriage ―reflects community consensus that
homosexual conduct is immoral.‖28 However, it did not address this
argument, instead reciting provisions of Massachusetts law that prohibit
discrimination against homosexuals.29 In short, the court did not
consider, much less respond to, any perfectionist arguments in favor of
conjugal marriage.
While the Goodridge majority ignored moral arguments for conjugal
marriage, it employed moral arguments in favor of same-sex marriage.
Despite the majority‘s disclaimers, much language in the decision
conveys the impression that, by striking conjugal marriage, the majority
understood itself to be engaged upon a project of moral approbation for
homosexual conduct and identity. The Goodridge majority objected to
exclusively conjugal marriage as ―an official stamp of approval on the‖
view that same-sex relationships ―are not worthy of respect‖ because
they are ―unstable.‖30 It saw itself as vindicating the ―dignity . . . of all
individuals.‖31 It saw the decision to marry one‘s choice of a sexual

26. Id. at 961.
27. Apparently, Connecticut‘s advocacy before its high court was even worse. There, the
state expressly disavowed that regulating or encouraging procreation constituted a rational basis for
conjugal marriage. Kerrigan v. Comm’r Pub. Health, —A.2d—, 289 Conn. 135, 163 n.19, 254
(Conn. 2008). The state argued (weakly) that its interest in preserving exclusively conjugal marriage
was its interest in preserving the traditional definition. Id. at 252.
28. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 967.
29. Id. If the SJC took the amici to argue that Massachusetts ought to discriminate against
homosexuals, then perhaps it understood itself to be responding to their moral argument. However,
the moral arguments of the amici in Goodridge did not entail, much less state expressly, that
discrimination against homosexuals is just, right, or morally permissible.
30. Id. at 962.
31. Id. at 948.
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partner as a decision that shape one‘s identity.32 Each of the plaintiffs in
Goodridge desired not merely ―to secure the legal protections and
benefits afforded to married couples and their children,‖ but also ―to
marry his or her partner in order to affirm publicly their commitment to
each other.‖33
This language stands in contrast to the majority‘s insistence that it
was not choosing sides on the question whether privileging exclusively
conjugal marriage serves moral ends. The majority here portrayed the
issue as one of public affirmation of and respect for an individual‘s
choice to marry a member of the same sex. Insistence upon this statemandated affirmation and respect makes sense only if the majority was
committed to the prior moral claims that marriage is primarily a vehicle
of affirmation of autonomous choice, no matter what that choice may be,
and that the conjugality element of marriage is not necessary to advance
the purposes of the institution.
It is instructive to note that the seven couples who sued the
Commonwealth in Goodridge sought approbation not for their friendship
or love, but more particularly for their sexual intimacy with each other.
The law and the culture in Massachusetts already affirmed non-sexual,
same-sex commitments in many other contexts, such as business
partnerships, fraternity pledges, and heroic acts on behalf of fellow
soldiers in the field of battle. That affirmation was insufficient for the
Goodridge plaintiffs. They sought approbation of a different kind. They
requested that the law of Massachusetts be re-written to express equal
affirmation of same-sex intimacy and opposite-sex, conjugal monogamy.
The SJC granted this request a few months after Goodridge in Opinions
of the Justices to the Senate.
It is also instructive to note the manner in which the SJC loaded the
dice, by tossing out the Commonwealth‘s understanding of the meaning
and purposes of marriage and substituting its own fundamental element
into the equation. The SJC dismissed, in three short paragraphs, the
Commonwealth‘s interest in facilitating procreation. This prudential
consideration could not possibly justify conjugal marriage, the court
concluded, because some conjugal couples marry without procreating,
while some procreate through non-coital means.34 The majority
acknowledged that procreation is an ―unbridgeable difference between
same-sex and opposite-sex couples.‖35 However, the majority apparently
never considered that the Commonwealth‘s prudential interest in
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
Id. at 949.
Id. at 961–62.
Id. at 962.
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encouraging procreation and child-rearing might reflect a more
foundational moral interest in encouraging a particular type of
relationship, one of the benefits of which is the propagation of the human
race through procreation. The moral claim that conjugal marriage is a
basic human good, and therefore a rational object of choice with
significant societal benefits (including procreation),36 never appeared in
the court‘s reasoning, not even long enough to be rejected.
Instead, the SJC read into the institution of marriage its own moral
value: stability of relationship.37 Marriage, the majority insisted, has as
its central aim the promotion of ―stable, exclusive relationships.‖38 The
Commonwealth was wrong, the majority thought, to imply that same-sex
relationships are ―inherently unstable.‖39 This ―destructive stereotype‖
attends the equally impermissible conclusion that same-sex relationships
are ―inferior‖ to conjugal marriages.40 Why, in the SJC‘s view, are samesex couples equally able to satisfy the foundational elements of
marriage? They are capable of having stable relationships. Of course this
is true as a factual matter. However, it resolves the question whether
same-sex marriage is consistent with the meaning and purposes of
marriage only if that meaning and those purposes boil down exclusively
to relational stability. The court did not explain why this might be so.
Thus stability became the sine qua non of marriage in Massachusetts, to
the exclusion of all other moral considerations, without a hearing on
other, competing moral claims.
Furthermore, the SJC‘s concern for relational stability extended only
to intimate same-sex couples. The court did not explain its prior moral
judgment that intimate, same-sex relationships are more deserving of the
Commonwealth‘s protection against stability than polygamous,
polyandrous, or other intimate groupings.

36. This claim is examined in Section VII.A, infra.
37. The majority invoked relational stability as the central justification and purpose for
marriage throughout its opinion. It asserted, ―Civil marriage anchors an ordered society by
encouraging stable relationships over transient ones.‖ Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 954. Civil marriage
reflected ―the Legislature‘s deep commitment to fostering stable families.‖ Id. at 969. Same-sex
marriage would ensure a ―stable family structure‖ for children of persons involved in same-sex
relationships. Id. at 964. Ultimately, the majority insisted that the Commonwealth failed to identify a
justification for conjugal marriage that was consistent with ―promoting stable families.‖ Id. at 968.
Indeed, the majority found a way to make every other purpose for marriage subsidiary to relational
stability.
38. Id. at 969.
39. Id. at 962.
40. Id.
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B. A Perfectionist Holding
After the SJC‘s Goodridge decision, the Massachusetts legislature
proposed creating a civil union institution endowed with all of the rights
and privileges appurtenant to marriage. This proposal, if adopted, would
have eradicated the ostensible harm that the SJC identified in Goodridge:
that the conjugal marriage statute denied same-sex couples ―access to
civil marriage itself, with its appurtenant social and legal protections,
benefits, and obligations.‖41 The proposal would have honored ―the
individual liberty and equality safeguards of the Massachusetts
Constitution,‖ as the SJC read those safeguards in Goodridge, which
―protect both ‗freedom from‘ unwarranted government intrusion into
protected spheres of life and ‗freedom to‘ partake in benefits created by
the State for the common good.‖42
In Opinions of the Justices, the SJC rejected the civil union proposal
by a one-vote margin, explaining that conferring on same-sex couples the
tangible rights and privileges of marriage was insufficient to satisfy its
mandate in Goodridge.43 Opinions of the Justices belies the SJC‘s
ostensible concern, expressed in Goodridge, that conjugal marriage
denies to same-sex couples the ―[t]angible as well as intangible benefits
[that] flow from marriage.‖44 After the Opinions of the Justices the SJC
can no longer consistently assert that the hardship that conjugal marriage
works upon same-sex couples ―for no rational reason‖45 is the ground for
its creation of same-sex marriage. The proposal of the Massachusetts
legislature to create civil unions would have eradicated the ―omnipresent
hardships‖46 by granting to ―spouses in a civil union‖ ―all the benefits,
protections, rights and responsibilities afforded by the marriage laws.‖47
Indeed, the legislature‘s proposal would have alleviated each of the
legally cognizable harms that the Goodridge plaintiffs had allegedly
suffered as a result of the conjugal marriage statute.48 Only the lack of
affirmation by the Commonwealth would have persisted. The proposal
would have addressed the shortcomings that the SJC saw in conjugal
marriage, among them that non-married couples did not face the same
41. Id. at 950.
42. Id. at 959.
43. Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 569 (Mass. 2004).
44. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 955.
45. Id. at 968.
46. Opinions of the Justices, 802 N.E.2d at 567.
47. Id. at 568 (quoting Senate No. 2175 section 2).
48. The harms identified in the complaint included difficulty gaining in-hospital access to a
child born to one partner and inability to gain coverage under a partner‘s insurance policy.
Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 950 n.6.
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restrictions on disposition of assets49 and did not enjoy the same property
rights50 as married couples. The SJC noted that same-sex couples could
not file tax returns jointly, hold property as tenants by the entirety, inherit
from each other, obtain spousal benefits and coverage by various
insurance policies, be entitled to bereavement leave, be subject to
universal divorce rules and obligations, or refrain from testifying against
each other.51
Notwithstanding that the legislature‘s proposal would have attached
all of those rights, privileges, and obligations to civil unions, the majority
in Opinions of the Justices rejected the civil union proposal as
impermissibly discriminatory and irrational; the proposal failed to
survive the least rigorous scrutiny, thought the SJC.52 The civil union
proposal could not ―possibly be held rationally to advance‖ any
legitimate state interests.53 Indeed, the majority opinion in the Opinions
of the Justices stands for the proposition that no civil union statute that
the Massachusetts legislature might concoct could conceivably be
supported by a rational basis.54
Thus, interpreting its own Goodridge decision less than three months
after it handed down Goodridge, the four-justice majority in Opinions of
the Justices abandoned the posture of moral neutrality it had adopted in
Goodridge. It turned instead to affirmation of the equal moral worth of
conjugal and non-conjugal intimate relationships. Despite the veneer of
morally neutral equality, this is a morally partisan project. It entails
removal of the conjugality element from marriage, which necessarily
rests upon a more foundational (morally partisan) rejection of those ends
that are furthered by the participation of both a man and a woman.
Without expressly acknowledging what it was doing, the SJC majority
disregarded what the Commonwealth of Massachusetts had always taken
as true, namely that the meaning and purposes of marriage (including
reproduction, tradition, the bringing together of two persons who are
inherently different) are advanced by insistence upon conjugality, the
SJC majority substituted its own conception of the meaning and purpose
of marriage and its own notion of what requirements would best serve
that meaning and purpose.
After Opinions of the Justices, intimate same-sex relationships are
accorded, if the members of the relationship so choose, a designation that

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 955 n.13.
Id. at 955.
Id. at 955–57.
Opinions of the Justices, 802 N.E.2d at 569.
Id. at 569.
See id. at 581 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
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historically has distinguished conjugal monogamy from all other
relationships, whether same-sex, opposite-sex, or asexual. Intimate samesex relationships are thus distinguished both from non-intimate same-sex
relationships—friendships and business, fraternal, and professional
relationships between members of the same sex—and from non-intimate
opposite-sex relationships. Conjugal marriage no longer occupies a
unique class, but rather shares its place of honor with same-sex intimacy.
When taken together, the Goodridge decision and the Opinions of the
Justices can reasonably be read only as a declaration that the law must
not merely remove all legal impediments from same-sex couples desiring
to live together as married couples, but must also lend its approbation to
homosexual intimacy, teaching citizens that homosexual intimacy is a
reason for action equally as reasonable or worthy as conjugal marital
union. Grasping the implications of Opinions of the Justices, one scholar
has construed the right of same-sex couples to marry in Massachusetts
―not as a right to be free from state interference nor even a right to be
interfered with by the State, but as a right to receive community
endorsement.‖55 It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the SJC
intended as a consequence of its rulings that endorsement in public law
55. Randy Lee, Finding Marriage Amidst a Sea of Confusion: A Precursor to Considering
the Public Purposes of Marriage, 43 CATH. LAW. 339, 342 (2004). Lee believes that the
community‘s endorsement is not forthcoming, however. All the SJC has to offer same-sex couples is
the words of community approval without the attendant reality that the community of Massachusetts
citizens actually approves. Id. at 342–43. Lee finds the SJC‘s mandate confusing because it
constitutes an (in Lee‘s estimation, ultimately unsuccessful) attempt to order ―people in a freethinking society . . . that they must think in a certain way.‖ Id. at 342. Lee thinks that the putative
right to force citizens to accept the view that homosexuality is a morally worthy end is illusory. Id. at
343.
Contrary to Lee‘s supposition, the SJC‘s endorsement of a particular moral position does
not entail ordering thoughts about morality. This endorsement interferes with freedom of thought no
more than other endorsements of moral positions contained in the law. Laws prohibiting possession
of narcotics, for example, do not interfere with the freedom of citizens to think and believe that
possession and use of recreational drugs are not, in fact, immoral acts or that such acts ought not to
be criminalized. By the same token, repeal of a criminal prohibition on adultery does not interfere
with the thoughts and beliefs of those who consider adultery immoral, even those who believe
adultery ought to be criminalized qua immoral act.
However, as Lee seems to discern, the SJC‘s mandate in the Opinions of the Justices is
not without consequence for public discourse on the question which sexual relationships are, and are
not, moral. That positive law influences public conceptions of the right and the good is an
uncontroversial observation. See Francis Cardinal George, Law and Culture in the United States, 48
AM. J, JURIS. 131, 135 (2003); Francis Cardinal George, Law and Culture, 1 AVE MARIA L. REV. 1
(2003) [hereinafter Law and Culture]; Adam J. MacLeod, The Law as Bard: Extolling a Culture’s
Virtues, Exposing Its Vices, and Telling Its Story, 1 J. JURIS. 13 (2008). As Francis George has
observed, the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) recognized ―that
law, whether just or unjust, functions as a teacher.‖ Law and Culture, at 6. The law is capable of
initiating a great cultural change and of reinforcing the status quo. Id. ―The Justices [who decided
Brown] knew that segregation, as a cultural practice, would not end so long as law testified, and thus
taught, in season and out, that black and white are unequal.‖ Id. It is no accident that the SJC
majority invoked Brown in Opinions of the Justices. Opinions of the Justices, 802 N.E.2d at 569 n.3.
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of homosexual intimacy would lead people to reconsider (and reject) a
view that the SJC deemed morally incorrect, namely that conjugal
marital relationships are more worthy reasons for action than nonconjugal relationships.
Whether or not the SJC‘s decisions have caused citizens to reject
special approbation for conjugal marriage, the SJC‘s purpose appears to
have been, at least in part, to influence moral conceptions of the human
person and marriage. The SJC majority reached farther than was
necessary merely to remove social stigma from homosexual intimacy.56
It went beyond de-stigmatization to an affirmative declamation of a
special moral worth inherent in homosexual intimacy. Indeed, it placed
homosexual intimacy on equal footing with conjugal monogamy, to
which the Commonwealth had always accorded special status, apart from
and superior to the status accorded to friendship, business relationships,
political associations, polygamous groupings, and other relational
arrangements. By its ruling in Opinions of the Justices, a majority of the
SJC held that, like conjugal marriage, same-sex intimacy is deserving of
a special status, higher honor than that accorded to other intimate
arrangements (such as polyandry and polygamy), and non-sexual
arrangements, such as friendships and political parties.
The majority either promoted same-sex intimacy to a special status
superior to other, common relational arrangements or demoted marriage
from its special status in order to bring it down to the level of other
relationships. Either way, the court made a morally partisan judgment
about the relative moral worth of same-sex intimacy vis-à-vis conjugal
marriage, on one hand, and less privileged relationships, on the other.
This judgment is predicated upon the presupposition that same-sex
intimacy is more deserving of the special esteem accorded to marriage
than are other common relational arrangements. This presupposition is
56. This point did not escape the attention of Justice Sosman, who dissented. He stated,
Today‘s answer to the Senate also assumes that such ―invidious discrimination‖
may be found in the mere name of the proposed licensing scheme. If the name chosen
were itself insulting or derogatory in some fashion, I would agree, but the term ―civil
union‖ is a perfectly dignified title for this program-it connotes no disrespect. Rather,
four Justices today assume that anything other than the precise word ―marriage‖ is
somehow demeaning. Not only do we have an insistence that the name be identical to the
name used to describe the legal union of opposite-sex couples, but an apparent insistence
that the name include the word ―marriage.‖ From the dogmatic tenor of today‘s answer to
the Senate, it would appear that the court would find constitutional infirmity in legislation
calling the legal union of same-sex couples by any name other than ―marriage,‖ even if
that legislation simultaneously provided that the union of opposite-sex couples was to be
called by the precise same name.
Opinions of the Justices, 802 N.E.2d at 579 n.5.
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anything but obvious. Why is same-sex intimacy more deserving of the
appellation ―marriage‖ than friendship, business partnership, polygamy,
polyandry, and political associations? The court did not address this
question.
In the Opinions of the Justices, the majority continued to insist that
its advice to the General Court was ―not a matter of social policy but of
constitutional interpretation.‖57 And it declaimed, as it had in Goodridge,
that Massachusetts may not interfere with deep-seated religious, moral,
and ethical convictions concerning the definition of ―marriage‖ and the
morality of homosexual conduct.58 However, notably absent from the
majority‘s opinion in Opinions of the Justices is the disclaimer, so
prominent in the majority opinion in Goodridge, that moral
considerations were irrelevant to the question then before it. Instead, the
majority denigrated the special status of conjugal marriage, which it
thought a form of ―invidious discrimination‖ ―under the guise of
protecting ‗traditional‘ values.‖59 In other words, only those moral
considerations that commend conjugal marriage were inappropriate
grounds for the SJC‘s decision; moral arguments in favor of same-sex
marriage were not merely appropriate but dispositive.60

57. Opinions of the Justices, 802 N.E.2d at 569.
58. Id. at 570.
59. Id.
60. One might argue that the SJC was being consistent to non-perfectionist principles
because it was not requiring the Commonwealth to recognize marriage at all, in the first instance.
The decision to recognize marriage at all was made by the legislature, the argument goes, and the
SJC was merely correcting an inequality within this set framework.
Though it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the SJC was advancing perfectionist
goals, for the reasons stated above, the extent of the SJC‘s perfectionist ambition is necessarily a
matter of speculation. For example, we do not know whether the SJC would accept a proposal by the
legislature to abolish marriage, civil unions, and all other similar institutions. The answer would
seem to turn on how far the SJC is willing to go to ensure that respect for same-sex intimacy
receives the law‘s ―stamp of approval.‖ Goodridge v. Dep‘t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 962
(Mass. 2003). It is conceivable that the SJC might consider itself constrained by the limits of its
judicial function from overruling a legislative decision to remove from the law approbation for all
committed, sexual relationships vis-à-vis non-committed or non-sexual relationships. That constraint
would operate as a limitation not upon the SJC‘s perfectionist principles but rather upon its power to
found legislation on those principles.
Furthermore, the legislative abolition of marriage-like institutions itself would be a
perfectionist act. And the SJC might approve such a proposal consistent with its perfectionist
ambition. Abolition of all marriage-like institutions would, in light of the extensive tradition in civil
and common law of favoring conjugal marriage constitute a perfectionist coup in favor of nonconjugal unions. To remove the special approbation accorded to conjugal marriage throughout the
history of our legal tradition is to make a statement about the value of non-conjugal unions,
including same-sex unions, as against conjugal marriage. More generally, abolition would serve to
teach through positive law the partisan assertion that all sexual unions are equally moral.
On the other hand, it is equally rational to infer that the SJC would reject this
hypothetical legislation as inconsistent with its commitment to placing the law‘s stamp of approval
on same-sex monogamy vis-à-vis non-committed relationships, polygamy, etc. Such a holding
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III. MORALLY NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES CANNOT EXPLAIN THE SJC‘s
DECISIONS
The SJC appears to have predicated its decisions on two ostensibly
neutral principles: equality and autonomy. However, if these principles
are to remain morally neutral then neither principle justifies the holding
in Opinions of the Justices. A neutral conception of equality or autonomy
does not lead one to conclude that same-sex intimacy should be accorded
a status superior to other common, relational arrangements, such as
friendships or polygamous groupings. Only when infused with the prior,
moral assumption that homosexual intimacy adds something to same-sex
friendship equal in value to conjugal monogamy, do these principles
render the SJC‘s decisions comprehensible.
Equality between homosexuals and heterosexuals does not entail the
conclusion that the majority reached in the Opinions of the Justices
because the civil union proposal would not have treated heterosexuals
and homosexuals differently. Unless the majority employed a
perfectionist approach to the issue how ―marriage‖ should be defined, its
reasoning on grounds of equality makes no sense.
The majority‘s invocation, in both Goodridge and Opinions of the
Justices, of the Supreme Court‘s Lawrence v. Texas61 decision, and its
favorable quotation of the mystery-of-life passage from Planned
Parenthood v. Casey,62 might suggest that the SJC impliedly rested its
perfectionist reasoning on some principle of personal autonomy.
However, the SJC‘s rejection of the legislature‘s civil union proposal
renders that reading implausible; the Massachusetts legislature‘s civil
union proposal would have supplied the autonomy that Lawrence and
Casey demanded.

would be perfectly consistent with Goodridge and Opinions of the Justices. And that holding would
be manifestly perfectionist.
It is clear that the California Supreme Court would not permit the State to abolish civil
marriage. That court stated that the fundamental, individual right to marry a person of one‘s own
choice includes a right to get married in the first instance, which the State may not abolish or
abrogate. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 61–62, 425–26. The right to marry ―cannot properly be
understood as simply the right to enter into such a relationship if (but only if) the Legislature chooses
to establish and retain it. Id. at 62 (emphasis original). See also Kerrigan v. Comm’r Pub. Health, —
A.2d—, 289 Conn. 135, 323-24 (Conn. 2008) (Zarella, J. dissenting).
Thanks to Andy Olree for calling my attention to this hypothetical.
61. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
62. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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A. The Court’s Equality Analysis
Dicta in the majority opinion in Opinions of the Justices suggest that
the majority thought it was applying some principle of equality. That
homosexuals and heterosexuals ought to be equal before the law is a
morally neutral proposition, which meets with the agreement of
advocates on both sides of the ―marriage‖ question. For this reason, the
SJC‘s attempt in its Goodridge decision to contrast the moral views of
those who believe ―that homosexual conduct is immoral‖ and those who
believe ―that homosexual persons should be treated no differently than
their heterosexual neighbors,‖ 63 not only rested upon a false distinction
but also constituted unhelpful and unnecessary ad hominem against
advocates of exclusively conjugal marriage. Indeed, there is no
inconsistency in both advocating for exclusively conjugal marriage and
affirming the equal worth and dignity of homosexual and heterosexual
persons. Thus, if the holding of Opinions of the Justices follows from
some principle of equal protection of the law, then the decision might be
morally neutral in at least one sense.
The holding does not so follow. Though one may affirm equality
without engaging in moral partisanship, the SJC majority‘s reasoning
cannot reasonably be read as application of an equality principle. The
majority found inequality between the institution of marriage and the
proposed civil union institution. It then conflated individual
Massachusetts citizens with the respective institutions in which the
majority assumed each individual would be most likely to participate.
Stripped of this conflation, the majority‘s reasoning falls apart. Equal
protection of heterosexual and homosexual persons does not entail that
conjugal and non-conjugal relationships must receive equal approbation
in law.
1. The majority’s fatal conflation
Though the SJC majority lamented the legislature‘s proposal ―to
relegate same-sex couples to a different status‖ than that which conjugal
couples enjoy,64 it did not undertake to explain whether it thought the
proposal subjected homosexuals, considered as individuals, to a different
status than heterosexuals. Rather, it objected to the dissimilitude between
the labels for marriage and civil unions.65 This dissimilitude, it thought,
63. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 948.
64. Opinions of the Justices, 802 N.E.2d at 569.
65. Id. at 570.
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relegated ―same-sex, largely homosexual, couples to second-class
status.‖66
This last statement, which glossed over the real and important
distinctions between same-sex couples, the institutions of civil unions
and marriage, and individual homosexuals, is the only indication that the
majority ever recognized, however briefly, its conflation of the
institution of civil unions with the persons of individual homosexuals. To
the extent that the majority intended to rest its reasoning on a principle of
equality, this conflation is fatal to its reasoning. That civil unions would
have been distinct from marriages would not have worked invidious
discrimination, or any type of discrimination, based on sexual
orientation; the Massachusetts legislature distinguished not between
persons but between institutions. Under the legislature‘s proposal, a
heterosexual person could have entered into either a civil union (as the
majority implicitly acknowledged in Opinions of the Justices) or a
marriage; a homosexual person could enter into either a marriage with a
person of the opposite sex (as he or she could before Goodridge) or a
civil union with a person of the same or opposite sex.
An analogy here might prove useful. The state does not discriminate
against non-religious persons (conceding, for the moment, that such a
creature exists) by recognizing in law a distinction between churches,
synagogues, and mosques, on the one hand, and Kiwanis and Rotary
clubs on the other. This is true even though religious institutions have
historically occupied a position of special honor in American law and
culture.67 For the same reasons, states do not violate a neutral principle of
equality by distinguishing between conjugal marriage and other
relational arrangements.
The SJC majority had expressly acknowledged this distinction
between individuals and institutions in its Goodridge decision. In
redefining ―marriage‖ it chose to employ the terms ―same sex‖ and
―opposite sex,‖ rather than ―homosexual‖ and ―heterosexual,‖ because
―[n]othing in our marriage law [prior to the Goodridge decision]
precludes people who identify themselves (or who are identified by
66. Id.
67. An additional analogy may be employed by substituting ―Democrat‖ for ―heterosexual,‖
―Republican‖ for ―homosexual,‖ ―non-profit‖ for ―marriage,‖ and ―corporation‖ for ―civil union.‖ It
is commonly believed that Democrats are more inclined toward non-profit work and Republicans are
more inclined toward for-profit work. However, by distinguishing between non-profit, eleemosynary
institutions and for-profit, wealth-creating institutions, states do not discriminate against
Republicans. This is true even if the state grants special privileges and rights, such as tax
exemptions, to non-profit institutions. And it is true even though, in many circles, non-profit work is
considered more virtuous and self-sacrificial and a higher calling than commercial labor. It would
remain true if the state gave for-profit corporations the same rights and privileges as non-profit
institutions.
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others) as gay, lesbian, or bisexual from marrying persons of the opposite
sex.‖68 For this reason, the question that the SJC answered in Goodridge
was not, as many have mistakenly supposed, whether homosexuals are
entitled to marry. As the SJC recognized in Goodridge, marriage was
available to both heterosexuals and homosexuals on equal terms.69
For these reasons, sexual orientation is simply irrelevant to the
question whether one satisfies the qualifications for conjugal marriage.
Of course, special approbation for conjugal marriage will adversely
affect homosexuals by impeding their preferences; a homosexual who
chooses to enter into a relationship with a member of the same sex
cannot in a conjugal marriage state use the word ―spouse‖ to describe his
or her chosen partner. However, the frustration of certain preferences
does not amount to a legally cognizable inequality, even where the
contrasted preferences are equally felt and the frustration of preferences
is unequally distributed. The disparate impact of conjugal marriage laws
on homosexuals does not create a classification based on sexual
orientation because equal protection is implicated only when a state
―selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part
‗because of,‘ not merely ‗in spite of,‘ it adverse effects upon an
identifiable group.‖70
Like homosexuals, polygamists also would prefer not to be confined
to a choice between conjugal marriage and not marrying, but the law
does not discriminate against them by presenting to them only those
options. In a more trivial case, someone living in Oklahoma might prefer
not to be confined to a choice on Saturday between watching Oklahoma
football and Oklahoma State football on television. They might prefer to
watch Stanford. The frustration of that preference, though it causes a
disproportionately adverse effect upon the Stanford fan, does not mean
that the television company is discriminating against that person based
on where they attended school.
Once one has identified the conflation in which the SJC indulged, it
becomes easier to see why the SJC‘s reasoning is morally partisan. One
can defend conjugal marriage without denying that heterosexuals and
homosexuals ought to be treated equally before the law.71 Thus a neutral
principle of equality does not entail the SJC‘s holding. Instead, the
proposition that the SJC is left defending is that there exist no relevant,

68. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 953 n.11. Later, in Opinions of the Justices the majority
objected to conjugal marriage‘s ban against same-sex couples, not as pairs of homosexuals but rather
―as same-sex couples.‖ Opinions of the Justices, 802 N.E.2d at 569.
69. Id.
70. Personnel Adm‘r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
71. See infra Part VII for a defense along these lines.
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moral or prudential distinctions between the sexes. A man ought to
equally be permitted to marry a woman or a man; a woman should be
free to marry a man or a woman. In the SJC‘s view, gender does not
matter. The court has removed from ―marriage‖ an element (conjugality,
with its attendant uniting and procreative functions) that the
Commonwealth considered essential to the meaning and purposes of
marriage. It has substituted its own meaning (self-fulfillment) and
purposes (state-sanctioned affirmation of the special moral worth of
homosexual intimacy), and its own conception of how to advance that
meaning and those purposes. One can reach the conclusion that same-sex
unions and conjugal marriages ought to be treated identically in positive
law only if one begins with the presupposition that gender and
conjugality are irrelevant to the meaning and purposes of marriage.72
In Goodridge, the majority did not address the respective rights of
individual homosexuals and individual heterosexuals, much less did it
address the rights of homosexuals qua homosexuals. By the same token,
the question before the SJC in Opinions of the Justices was not whether
homosexuals must choose civil unions or no state-sanctioned
commitment and be excluded from civilly recognized institutions
altogether. Like the conjugal marriage statute, the legislature‘s civil
union proposal did not distinguish or discriminate between heterosexuals
and homosexuals.73 For the reasons stated above, the legislature‘s
proposal accorded to any person, regardless of sexual orientation, equal
choices with respect to civil, conjugal marriage and civil unions.

72. See George, supra note 15, at 126.
73. Another argument, one that the SJC majority did not employ, would have been that
exclusively conjugal marriage results in gender discrimination. Justice Greaney, writing in
concurrence, used a version of this argument. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 971 (Greaney, J.,
concurring). A majority of the California Supreme Court expressly rejected this argument. In re
Marriage Cases, S147999, slip op. at 85 (Supreme Court of California, George CJ, Kennard,
Werdegar, Moreno, JJ, May 15, 2008). Because under conjugal marriage laws a man may marry a
woman but a woman may not do so, the law might be understood to discriminate on the basis of sex.
However, this argument fails for two reasons. First, equal protection forbids only
discrimination on the basis of a trait that is irrelevant to the purpose of the law. To assume that
gender is irrelevant to marriage is to assume a controversial, morally partisan position. Thus, even if
the SJC had found constitutionally infirm discrimination on the basis of sex, rather than
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, its holding and reasoning would have nevertheless
been morally partisan.
Second, conjugal marriage does not discriminate on the basis of gender because the law
has equal application to both genders. Neither a man nor a woman may marry a member of the same
sex. The California Court of Appeal made this point in In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 675,
706 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
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2. The majority’s faulty syllogism
Despite the SJC‘s invocation of Brown v. Board of Education,74 the
rule and reasoning of Brown was not at all relevant to the issue in
Opinions of the Justices.75 The offensive inequality that Brown
eradicated resulted from black children having no choice where to attend
school; blacks were shuttled into separate, and inherently unequal,
schools because they were black. Similarly, contrary to the SJC‘s
invocation of it, Loving v. Virginia76 is inapplicable to the conjugality
issue. Loving overruled a regime that prohibited blacks, qua blacks, and
whites, qua whites, from marrying each other. The law that a white
woman (for example) could not marry a black man constituted an
inequality because it discriminated between black and white men on no
grounds other than their respective races.
The SJC in Opinions of the Justices confronted an entirely different
scenario. Under the Massachusetts legislature‘s civil union proposal, a
person would be assigned to different institutions—civil union or
conjugal marriage—according to the choice he or she made, not
according to his or her status as homosexual, heterosexual, bisexual, or
based upon any other characteristics or predispositions. The mistaken
assumption that a heterosexual person will always choose conjugal
marriage and a homosexual person will always choose civil union, upon
which the SJC‘s equality analysis rests (and which the same SJC
majority had expressly rejected in Goodridge), disregards the importance
of individual choice. And the principle of equality does not entail that
persons who choose union with a member of the same sex must be
permitted to call that union the same name as that assigned to conjugal,
monogamous unions.
The common rejoinder to this distinction between persons and the
institutions they might choose is that homosexuals prefer union with
someone of the same sex, and thus are unlikely to choose conjugal
marriage. On this view, all persons must have available equally
meaningful choices. The choice of conjugal marriage is not a meaningful
choice for at least some homosexuals because it is a choice to which they
are not predisposed.
This rejoinder suffers from fatal flaws. For one, the meaningfulness
of the choices available does not necessarily correlate with the sexual
74. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), cited in Opinions of the Justices,
802 N.E.2d at 569 n.3.
75. For a more complete discussion of this point, see Dwight G. Duncan, How Brown is
Goodridge? The Appropriation of a Legal Icon, 14 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 27 (2004).
76. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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orientation of the chooser. Heterosexuals might be predisposed to a
same-sex arrangement. Non-homosexuals might choose civil unions for
any number of reasons, including a desire to support an ailing relative or
to benefit from tax breaks. Any discrimination between marriage and
civil unions will not fall exclusively on homosexuals, or even on
homosexuals qua homosexuals, but rather on all persons who would, if
the law allowed, choose to be legally united with a member of the same
sex. Furthermore, those homosexuals who, for whatever reason, choose
conjugal marriage would suffer no prejudice at all from any disparity
between marriage and civil unions.
Under the Massachusetts legislature‘s civil union proposal, which the
SJC rejected, homosexuals would have had exactly the same number of
meaningful choices (as same-sex union advocates conceive of
meaningfulness) as heterosexuals had. A homosexual and a heterosexual
would each have available the options to enter into a civil union with one
member of the same sex or to enter into a civil marriage with one
member of the opposite sex. That the heterosexual might (but not
necessarily would) prefer marriage and the homosexual might (but not
necessarily would) prefer civil union would not be a reason to call the
choices available to them unequal.
However, assuming arguendo that the meaningful choices available
to a homosexual are not equal to those available to a heterosexual, a
neutral principle of equality does not entail changing this circumstance.
Any mandate that any particular individual, whether heterosexual,
homosexual, or asexual, have a meaningful choice does not follow from
the neutral principle of equality employed in Brown. It might arguably
follow from some commitment to a particular moral conception.
However, commitment to morally neutral equality does not entail that all
persons have available to them all desired options, all meaningful
options, or even a plurality of options.
For example, under the Massachusetts legislature‘s civil union
proposal, neither the heterosexual nor the homosexual would have had
the option to enter into a civil union or marriage with more than one
person. The option to receive state-sanction for a plural relationship
might be preferable to a homosexual or heterosexual who prefers
polygamy or polyandry, and some morally partisan principle, such as a
personal autonomy right to plural marriage,77 might be invoked in favor
of legal recognition of polygamy.
Nevertheless, under current Massachusetts law, both the heterosexual
and the homosexual are equally unable to choose to enter into a

77. See infra Part III.B.
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polygamous institution sanctioned by the law of the Commonwealth.
That the Commonwealth (thus far) sees no principled reason to make
available the choice of plural marriage does not violate equal protection.
Equality of persons before the law does not entail equality of the
institutions from which those persons may choose. Nor does equality of
persons require that persons have available to them all desired choices.
The Stanford fan is not denied equal protection of the law by being
forced to choose between Oklahoma and Oklahoma State games. The
would-be polyandrist is not denied equality before the law when she is
forced to choose between having one husband or no husbands. For the
same reasons, no morally neutral principle of equality explains the
majority‘s reasoning in Opinions of the Justices.
B. The Majority’s Invocation of Lawrence-type Autonomy
Those attempting to demonstrate the moral neutrality of the
Massachusetts same-sex marriage decisions might argue that the
decisions are premised upon a morally neutral principle of autonomy.
The argument might proceed as follows: regardless of whether one views
homosexual conduct as a good, one can nevertheless endorse the
proposition that the autonomy to choose homosexual conduct is, itself, a
desirable end. To prevent persons from choosing homosexual conduct, or
to stigmatize that choice by failing to approve of it in law, is to disparage
the autonomous choices of homosexual persons, and thus to infringe
upon their autonomy.
The SJC gave a hint of its inclination toward this view by its citation
of Lawrence v. Texas. In Goodridge, the SJC interpreted Lawrence to
mean ―that the core concept of human dignity,‖ found in the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause, ―precludes government intrusion
into . . . one‘s choice of an intimate partner.‖78 Recalling Lawrence, the
Goodridge majority stated:
Recently, the United States Supreme Court has reaffirmed that the
Constitution prohibits a State from wielding its formidable power to
regulate conduct in a manner that demeans basic human dignity, even
though that statutory discrimination may enjoy broad public support.
The Court struck down a statute criminalizing sodomy. See Lawrence,
supra at 2478 (―The liberty protected by the Constitution allows
79
homosexual persons the right to make this choice‖).

78. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 948.
79. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 958 n.17.
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The Goodridge majority did not explain how the anti-sodomy statutes in
Lawrence ―demean[ed] human dignity.‖80 However, at the least, it saw
anti-sodomy laws and conjugal marriage laws as two forms of the same,
impermissible regulation of sexual conduct.
It seems reasonable to infer that the Goodridge majority thought it
permissible for the Commonwealth to regulate sexual conduct in the first
instance. If the autonomy principle forbids all legislative judgments
concerning intimacy, then there ought to be no distinction between
marriage and non-marriage. The Court maintained that distinction. So the
Goodridge majority must have understood the autonomy principle
articulated in Lawrence to require the State, when regulating sexual
conduct, to refrain from preferring one type of conduct to another. And
the SJC‘s interpretation of Lawrence appears in a footnote to the
majority‘s assertion that historical understandings of ―marriage‖ ―must
yield to a more fully developed understanding of the invidious[ness]‖ of
conjugal marriage.81 One might reasonably infer that the Goodridge
majority saw Lawrence as exemplifying that more fully developed
understanding.
This conception of autonomy made other appearances in Goodridge.
The majority chided the dissent for its ―narrow focus‖ on procreation as a
basis for a fundamental right to marry.82 It thought a more expansive, and
thus appropriate, view of marriage encompassed considerations of
―personal autonomy‖ in addition to family life and child rearing.83 And it
ultimately perceived conjugal marriage as ―incompatible with the
constitutional principle of respect for individual autonomy.‖84 Echoing
the self-actualization rhetoric of Casey and Lawrence, the Goodridge
majority opined, ―the decision whether and whom to marry is among
life‘s momentous acts of self-definition.‖85
It thus appears that the Goodridge majority thought that the
autonomy principle at work in Lawrence explained, at least in part, what
injustice it saw in Massachusetts‘ conjugal marriage statute. An unlawful
government intrusion into autonomous choice, as the SJC conceived of
it, includes the failure of state government, where it has recognized
marriage, to endorse the choice as one‘s marital partner of whomever one
wants to choose. If the autonomy principle of Lawrence supports this

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
Id. at 958.
Id. at 962.
Id.
Id. at 949.
Id. at 955.
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conception of constitutional liberty, and if Lawrence is morally neutral,
then Goodridge might be saved from moral partisanship.
However, Lawrence fails to salvage the moral neutrality of the
Massachusetts same-sex marriage decisions. Lawrence is susceptible to
two interpretations. Perhaps the Lawrence Court meant to assert that
protection of autonomy requires the State to treat all forms of sexual
conduct the same. The SJC preferred this interpretation. Viewed this
way, neither Lawrence nor the autonomy principle employed in
Lawrence is morally neutral; the Lawrence Court in this view has
substituted its own conception of the meaning and purposes of marriage
for those adopted by all of the states. Alternatively, Lawrence might
stand merely for the proposition that the State may not criminalize
certain types of sexual conduct. Viewed in this manner, whether it is
morally neutral or not, Lawrence offers no logical framework for
understanding or explaining the Massachusetts decisions.
1. Lawrence as guarantor of the right to choose any type of sexual
conduct
If, as the SJC seems to suppose, Lawrence stands for the proposition
that constitutional protection of autonomy requires the State to validate
all choices with respect to sexual relationships then employment of the
autonomy principle articulated in Lawrence does not save the
Massachusetts same-sex marriage decisions from moral partisanship for
two reasons. First, predicating legal approbation of homosexual conduct
on a principle of autonomy does not avoid the necessity of demonstrating
that homosexual conduct is valuable. As Robert George has
demonstrated, autonomy as an end has no intrinsic value.86 Autonomy
adds no value to a valueless choice because autonomy itself does not
provide an ultimate reason for action. Rather, the value of an
autonomous choice lies in the end chosen.
For example, the autonomous choice to enter into a polygamous
relationship is not rendered valuable by virtue of its being freely and
autonomously made. A polygamous group in which all persons
participate voluntarily, free of coercion, does no violence to personal
autonomy. However, that fact does not make participation in the
polygamous arrangement a morally upright and valuable choice. Only if
polygamy is a morally valuable end for human choice can the
autonomous choice of polygamy be said to be morally valuable. The

86. George, supra note 6, at 173–82.
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value of the choice is determined by the end chosen, not by the fact of it
being chosen freely.
Second, Justice Kennedy‘s autonomy argument in Lawrence,87 if
interpreted the way we are considering it in this section, is itself morally
partisan. The Lawrence majority, like the Goodridge majority, made
express assertions of its moral neutrality, insisting that ―[ethical and
moral] considerations do not answer the question before us . . . .‖88 The
Lawrence majority decided that the ―majority‖ may not ―use the power
of the State to enforce . . . on the whole society‖ its view of homosexual
sodomy as immoral.89 However, like the anti-perfectionism of
Goodridge, the anti-perfectionism of Lawrence ran only in one direction.
The Court demonstrated no qualms about using its power to enforce
against the states its moral view that autonomy entails a ―right to demand
respect‖ for homosexual conduct.90 Thus, the majority disdained
perfectionism in aid of traditional convictions about sexual conduct but
embraced moral partisanship in demanding respect in law for
homosexual conduct.
Indeed, the autonomy that Lawrence arguably defends and that the
Massachusetts SJC invoked is inconsistent with moral neutrality. The
Lawrence majority perceived an ―emerging awareness that liberty gives
substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their
private lives in matters pertaining to sex.‖91 The majority thought that
autonomy to choose homosexual relations follows from the right to
define one‘s own concept of meaning and the universe, which right,
according to Casey and Lawrence, the Due Process Clause protects.92
This is, to say the least, a controversial position that depends upon a prior
commitment to a particular, morally partisan view.
Assuming, arguendo, the validity of the Lawrence Court‘s premise—
the Due Process Clause protects a right to define the meaning of life—
the conclusion that the choice of homosexual conduct promotes selfactualization does not follow. Unless one starts with the presupposition
that homosexual conduct is instrumental to the self-actualization process
described in Casey, one does not arrive at the Lawrence Court‘s
conclusion that Casey requires the legalization of homosexual sodomy.
Thus, even if this were the only conclusion that followed from the
87. Kennedy, writing for the majority, considered the prospect of declaring anti-sodomy laws
unconstitutional on grounds of equal protection but declined to do so. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558, 574–75 (2003).
88. Id. at 571.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 575.
91. Id. at 572.
92. Id. at 573–74 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851).
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Lawrence majority‘s autonomy principle, the reasoning would be
morally partisan.
But the Lawrence majority actually went further. In the Lawrence
majority‘s view, the State is not merely forbidden to interfere with the
autonomous choice of homosexual conduct but must, in addition, remove
from the law all stigma attending such conduct. The supposed ―right to
demand respect for [non-conjugal] conduct‖ requires the State to remove
from its criminal laws all expressions of disapprobation of homosexual
conduct, even where those expressions take the form of minor
prohibitions—misdemeanors, infractions—rarely or never enforced.93
The majority worried that, if the Court tolerated a criminal prohibition of
non-conjugal conduct, ―its stigma might remain even if it were not
enforceable . . . .‖ The majority imagined that an unenforced law
prohibiting non-conjugal conduct ―demeans the lives of homosexual
persons‖94 and denies to them the respect due to their choices.
This conception of liberty is controversial. Not only must persons be
free to act autonomously, but additionally, according to the Lawrence
majority, they must receive from the State respect for the choices they
make. It is not enough for the State to remain agnostic concerning the
morality of particular choices. Rather, the State must demonstrate in its
laws respect for choices that it hitherto treated as unworthy of respect.
One problem with this reasoning is that it rests upon the assumption
that anti-sodomy laws were predicated upon anti-homosexual animus, or
were directed at or intended to stigmatize homosexual conduct.
However, as an historical claim, this is simply untrue. As the Lawrence
majority noted, ―early American sodomy laws were not directed at
homosexuals as such but instead sought to prohibit nonprocreative sexual
activity more generally.‖95 Indeed, like conjugal marriage laws, antisodomy laws simply were not about homosexuals. Homosexual ―conduct
was not thought of as a separate category from like conduct between
heterosexual persons.‖96
Despite this history, the Lawrence majority thought the stigma of
anti-sodomy laws ―not trivial.‖97 Though sodomy was ―a minor offense
in the Texas legal system,‖ it was nevertheless ―a criminal offense with

93. Id. at 559, 575.
94. Id. at 575. This failure to distinguish between persons and their conduct, like the SJC‘s
failure to distinguish between persons and the institutions in which they choose to participate,
renders the Lawrence majority‘s reasoning translucent, at best.
95. Id. at 568.
96. Id. at 569.
97. Id. at 575.
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all that imports for the dignity of the persons charged.‖98 That persons
convicted under the Texas statute would be required to register as sex
offenders in at least four states ―underscores the consequential nature of
the punishment and the state-sponsored condemnation attendant to the
criminal prohibition.‖99
Note what the Lawrence majority did not say. It did not assert that
registration as a sex offender was a disproportionate expression of
societal disapprobation for homosexual conduct. Many persons who
consider homosexual conduct unworthy of persons who engage in it,
including this author, can readily agree that a State-sanctioned
association between persons who have engaged in homosexual sodomy
and (for example) persons who have molested children is an excessive
expression of disapprobation for homosexual conduct. One might further
oppose the requirement that persons convicted of homosexual sodomy
register as sex offenders on the additional, prudential ground that the
requirement does not serve the purpose of the registry, which is to
protect the public from sexual predators. For these and other reasons, one
may (and this author does) agree with the proposition that same-sex
relationships ought not be stigmatized by criminalizing them and at the
same time maintain that states act rationally by according special status
to conjugal marriage. Between affirmatively stigmatizing same-sex
intimacy through criminal convictions and affirmatively according to
same-sex relationships the special status of marriage lies a third
alternative that is perfectly rational. Unless the SJC‘s morally partisan
interpretation of Lawrence prevails, one might rationally oppose
criminalization of sodomy on prudential grounds and defend conjugal
marriage on both moral and prudential grounds.
But the Lawrence majority argued neither that autonomy requires
any sort of proportionality between immoral sexual conduct and the
stigma attached to it nor that the registry requirement and criminal
statutes were unsound as a prudential matter. Instead, it argued that
autonomy requires the removal of all stigma from a particular type of
sexual conduct, namely homosexual sodomy. So, even a state like Texas
that makes homosexual sodomy a minor offense, or a state like Georgia
that never enforces its anti-sodomy statute has violated Due Process
because it has neglected its duty to remove from homosexual conduct all
societal disapprobation.
Therefore, states cannot satisfy the mandate of Lawrence by
removing all legal obstacles that lie between persons (whether
98. Id. Here again, the Lawrence majority was guilty of indulging a convenient conflation,
this one between persons and their choices. This conflation is fatal for reasons discussed below.
99. Id. at 576.

28

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 23

heterosexual or homosexual) and the sexual conduct of their choice:
homosexual sodomy, polygamy, etc. Instead, Lawrence demands that
states stop treating certain types of sexual conduct as immoral. And in
the SJC‘s hands, this prohibition means that states must refrain from
treating same-sex intimacy as less morally valuable (or even valuable for
different reasons) than conjugal marriage. To the extent that the
Lawrence Court intended this conception of autonomy, it adopted a
position of moral partisanship.
2. Lawrence as guarantor of freedom from criminal liability
If one can construct a morally neutral interpretation of Lawrence,
based on freedom from criminal liability, one still cannot thereby render
the Massachusetts same-sex marriage decisions morally neutral. If
Lawrence merely means that the State may not, for some morally neutral
reason, punish persons for engaging in homosexual conduct then the
reasoning of Lawrence fails to explain the Massachusetts same-sex
marriage decisions. This failure can be demonstrated with a few
observations.
a. Condemning a person’s conduct does not demean the person.
First, that the law disparages a particular choice or course of conduct
does not mean that the law demeans persons who engage in that conduct.
Thus, the conflation in which both the Lawrence Court and the
Goodridge court indulged, between persons and the choices they make,
is untenable. No one ought to suppose, for example, that conviction for
theft demeans the dignity of the thief. To the contrary, conviction of a
crime affirms, among other things, that the criminal conduct giving rise
to the conviction is unworthy of the person who engaged in it and is
inconsistent with that person‘s status as a law-abiding member of civil
society. That proposition rests upon the more foundational premise that
theft is an immoral act. Only by rejecting the immorality of theft can one
argue that the thief‘s dignity is demeaned by a conviction.
By the same token, the criminalization of homosexual sodomy
demeans homosexual persons only if homosexual sodomy is a good end
to be chosen. However, that predicate is a controversial, morally-partisan
proposition. Criminal prohibitions of homosexual acts may be
undesirable for prudential reasons, that is, as a matter of policy.
However, they do not disrespect homosexuals and are in that sense not
unjust unless homosexual acts are morally valuable. Indeed, if
homosexual conduct is unworthy of persons who engage in it, then the
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law does homosexuals a disservice by treating that conduct as a reason
for human choice and action. If, on the other hand, homosexual conduct
is a rational and good object of human choice, then criminalizing that
choice impedes the homosexual‘s integral human fulfillment. The
fundamental, moral question is thus unavoidable. To pretend that the
courts are not taking a side is simply to ignore the morally partisan
proposition underlying the SJC‘s autonomy principle.
b. Conjugal marriage does not stigmatize same-sex couples.
Second, the autonomy principle employed in Lawrence does not
entail the conclusion that the SJC reached in Opinions of the Justices.
The Lawrence majority insisted that states eradicate all criminal
prohibitions of homosexual conduct because it found constitutionally
impermissible the stigma attendant to status as a criminal.100 One simply
cannot equate the stigma of being a criminal and the stigma, if any, of
not being married, nor would participation in the civil unions that the
Massachusetts legislature proposed generate any stigma, much less a
stigma comparable to that attending criminal conviction.
By recognizing conjugal marriage, the State does not stigmatize
couples or other groupings, whether heterosexual or homosexual, same
sex or opposite sex, who are living in committed, supportive
arrangements. No one supposes, for example, that recognition of
conjugal marriage entails any disparagement of an adult daughter living
with and caring for an elderly mother or father. The statute recognizing
conjugal marriage does not demean the devoted daughter or deny her any
amount of respect for the choice she has made. Nor does it express
disapproval of her decision to care for her parents.
Of course, enshrinement of conjugal marriage as a legal and civic
institution does entail the approbation of committed, monogamous,
conjugal relationships relative to non-committed, non-monogamous, or
non-conjugal, sexually oriented arrangements. The State sanction of
marriage necessarily involves the State‘s affirmation that certain traits of
marriage are more desirable than whatever virtues other arrangements
might offer. However, no principle of autonomy, whether morally neutral
or otherwise, forbids such approbation. The State lends legal approbation
to all sorts of choices without infringing the autonomy of persons who do
not make the approved choices. Tax deductions for charitable donations,
for example, do not infringe upon the autonomy of persons who do not

100. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 560, 575 (2003).
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give to charity, much less (to paraphrase Lawrence) demean their lives or
disrespect them.
Furthermore, the state‘s obligation not to stigmatize certain forms of
intimacy does not entail affirmative endorsement of those relational
arrangements. For these reasons, Lawrence‘s prohibition against
stigmatizing same-sex intimacy does not mandate approval of same-sex
conduct.
c. Recognition of conjugal marriage does not limit autonomous
choice.
Perhaps a defender of Opinions of the Justices might argue,
extending Lawrence, that whether or not conjugal marriage laws attach
stigma to homosexual conduct, autonomy requires the state to eradicate
all legal preferences for conjugal marital conduct. On this view, a
person‘s choice of homosexual conduct is not entirely free and
autonomous because that choice involves forgoing the legal benefits of
marriage. Only by choosing conjugal marriage can a person who
identifies herself as homosexual enjoy the legal appurtenances of
marriage. Thus, a decision not to choose conjugal marriage is not truly
free and voluntary.
This view of Goodridge as an extension of the Lawrence autonomy
principle beyond the use the Lawrence Court made of it finds some
support in Goodridge itself. The Goodridge majority acknowledged that
the Lawrence Court had not resolved the constitutionality of conjugal
marriage, an issue that was not before it.101
However, this line of reasoning is not persuasive. That different
choices have disparate consequences is not a problem for autonomy. It is
uncontroversial that states may permissibly establish or recognize any
number of institutions even though, by choosing not to participate in a
particular state-sanctioned institution, individuals forego any rights or
benefits appurtenant to participation.
More to the point, this interpretation of Lawrence fails to account for
the decision of the majority in Opinions of the Justices. In that decision,
a majority of the SJC rejected as insufficient the General Court‘s
proposal to eradicate all legal barriers to actualization of same-sex sexual
preferences. A system of conjugal marriage and civil unions was unjust,
in the SJC‘s reasoning, notwithstanding its respect for the autonomy of
persons to choose to enter into homosexual relationships and in spite of
the legislature‘s removal of all legal obstacles to same-sex unions.
101. Goodridge v. Dep‘t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003).
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IV. CALIFORNIA‘S TURN WITH THE ISSUE
The lessons learned from Massachusetts‘ experience have direct
application in California, where that state‘s Supreme Court recently
considered a challenge to California‘s conjugal marriage laws. Both the
state legislature and the people of California, acting by popular initiative,
had in separate enactments endorsed the definition of ―marriage‖ as the
union of a man and woman. Also, as the Massachusetts legislature
proposed to do, the California ―Legislature has passed landmark
legislation providing substantially all the rights, responsibilities, benefits
and protections of marriage to same-sex couples who register as
domestic partners.‖102
In striking down California‘s statutory scheme by a one-vote margin,
the California high court adopted a perfectionist holding. Its holding is
perfectionist for many of the same reasons that the SJC‘s decisions in
Goodridge and Opinions of the Justices were perfectionist. However, its
perfectionism is much less subtle and can easily be perceived in the
court‘s determinations that California‘s marriage-domestic partnership
scheme infringed a fundamental right to marry and denied to
homosexuals equal protection of the laws. The court reached these
conclusions after committing itself to the moral claims that procreation
and gender are irrelevant to the question how ―marriage‖ ought to be
defined.
A. California Court of Appeal
After a state trial court concluded that conjugal marriage violates the
California constitution,103 the decision was appealed to the California
Court of Appeal. Like the SJC, the court of appeal began its analysis by
declaiming its moral neutrality. The court thought its task was ―not to
decide who has the most compelling vision of what marriage is, or what
it should be.‖104 The court recognized that the judicial branch ought not

102. In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 675, 684–85 (Cal. App. 2006) (citing California
Family Code §297–299.6). Domestic partners are defined as ―two adults who have chosen to share
one another‘s lives in an intimate and committed relationship of mutual caring.‖ Calif. Family Code
§ 297(a) (2004).
103. The provisions at issue are California Family Code section 300, which was enacted by
the California legislature and defines marriage as ―a personal relation arising out of a civil contract
between a man and a woman,‖ and Family Code section 308.5, which was enacted by voter initiative
and provides, ―Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California.‖
104. In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal.Rptr.3d at 685.
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pass judgment on the validity of any ―value‖ or prefer one moral
judgment over another.105
Unlike the SJC, the California Court of Appeal remained true to this
mandate. The California Court of Appeal avoided the conflation so fatal
to the ostensible moral neutrality of the Massachusetts SJC by
maintaining the distinction between individual persons of varying sexual
orientations and the institutions of marriage and domestic partnership.
The court expressly declined to refer to conjugal marriage as
―heterosexual unions,‖ noting that the conjugal marriage laws make no
reference to sexual orientation.106 The court noted that in California, as in
Massachusetts before Goodridge, homosexual individuals were free to
participate in conjugal marriages.107
The court acknowledged that California has historically understood
marriage to consist of the union of one man and one woman and inferred
that those challenging the conjugal marriage law were asking the court to
create a new right.108 It stated, ―Courts simply do not have the authority
to create new rights, especially when doing so involves changing the
definition of so fundamental an institution as marriage.‖109 Moral
judgments about balance, order, beauty, and goodness, and prudential
judgments concerning the best social policy are all in the exclusive
purview of the legislative branch, the court asserted.110 The question
before the court distilled to who gets to define ―marriage‖ in a
democratic state.111 The court stated, ―We believe this power rests in the
people and their elected representatives, and courts may not appropriate
to themselves the power to change the definition of such a basic social
institution.‖112 For these reasons, the court upheld California‘s conjugal
marriage law.113
The California Court of Appeal found that California‘s conjugal
marriage law neither deprived individuals of a vested fundamental right
nor discriminated against a suspect class.114 So like the Massachusetts
SJC before it, the court applied rational basis review.115 In its search for a
rational basis, the court was expressly mindful of California‘s domestic
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.
Id. at 691 n.9.
Id.
Id. at 685.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 686.
Id.
Id. at 686, 717.

1]

THE SEARCH FOR MORAL NEUTRALITY

33

partnership law, which grants to domestic partners, ―substantially ‗the
same rights, protections and benefits‘ as married spouses, and imposes
upon them ‗the same responsibilities, obligations and duties under law‘
as are imposed on married couples.‖116 The existence of this law
narrowed the court‘s inquiry to whether there existed a rational basis for
distinguishing between marriage and domestic partnership.
The rational basis for conjugal marriage, in the view of the Court of
Appeal, is the state‘s ―strong interest in promoting marriage.‖117 The
rational basis for domestic partnerships is the state‘s ―interest in
supporting stable family relationships.‖118 These interests are related by
the state‘s singular purpose of ―provid[ing] an institutional basis [to]
defin[e] the fundamental rights and responsibilities‖ of committed
couples, whether of the same sex or opposite sexes.119 The court
concluded, ―The state may legitimately support these parallel institutions
while also acknowledging their differences.‖120
Thus, the court of appeal steered clear of moral partisanship, leaving
to the people of California and their elected representatives the task of
discerning morally significant and morally neutral distinctions between
different relational arrangements. This article examines some of those
distinctions in section VI, below.
B. Perfectionist Arguments to the California Supreme Court
On appeal to the California Supreme Court, the petitioners who
sought judicial creation of same-sex marriage made expressly
perfectionist arguments. They did not shy away from moral partisanship,
instead asserting that ―lesbians and gay men are excluded from marriage
precisely because this institution is considered so sacred.‖121 As the
petitioners viewed the matter, California‘s domestic partnership laws
were insufficient to cure the putative constitutional infirmity inherent in
116. Id. at 719 (quoting Cal. Fam. Code § 297.5(a)).
117. Id. at 720.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 721.
121. Petitioner City and County of San Francisco‘s Opening Brief on the Merits at 2, In re
Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) (Case No. S147999) (emphasis in original). Of course,
this argument is factually wrong. As set out above, lesbians and gay men are not excluded from
marriage. The petitioners (predictably) assert that ―lesbian [sic] and gay men are totally denied
access to marriage, because marriage to a member of the opposite sex is nothing but a demeaning
sham for them.‖ Id. at 4. This curious and relativist conception of marriage—conjugal marriage has
no subjective value to homosexuals, or some of them—undercuts the petitioners‘ argument. Either
marriage has an objective, special meaning or it does not. If it does not, as the petitioners suggest,
then the only ground for the creation of same-sex marriage is the subjective, emotional attachment
some homosexuals have to the concept of same-sex marriage.
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conjugal marriage laws. The law must teach that homosexual intimacy is
equally as morally valuable as conjugal marriage, and thus of greater (or
at least different) worth than non-marital relationships, and California‘s
failure to endorse that moral claim was constitutionally impermissible. In
the words of the petitioners, the state‘s separate categories for marriage
and domestic partnerships ―unavoidably and unmistakably teaches‖ a
moral lesson that the petitioners deemed unconstitutional. 122
The petitioners spoke of a societal ―homage‖ paid to marriage.123
They asserted that marriage affects both the perception that others have
of the married person and that person‘s self-image.124 They argued that
participation in the institution improves psychological well-being.125 And
they revealed the core of their complaint when they asserted that
conjugal marriage laws send a ―powerful message . . . : the State will
recognize, but it will not honor,‖ intimate same-sex relationships.126
The honor that the petitioners sought for same-sex relationships was
forthcoming only if the California Supreme Court accepted the claim that
same-sex intimacy and conjugal marriage are morally equivalent. That
claim is morally partisan in the extreme. Nevertheless, the California
high court adopted it as its own.
C. The California Supreme Court’s Decision
The California Supreme Court‘s ruling is predicated upon the
proposition that gender is irrelevant to the marriage question. A woman
(for example) can choose to marry either a woman or a man. Either
choice is equally as morally and socially valuable. Attendant to this
proposition is the rejection of the State‘s conception of the meaning and
purposes of marriage. The court tossed out the traditional elements of
marriage and substituted its own elements in their place. And it
denigrated the purposes of marriage—such as procreation—as the state
had identified them. It created a new purpose for marriage: individual
self-fulfillment.
These are controversial and morally partisan predicates, and they
infuse the court‘s additional controversial claims that conjugal marriage
does not deserve a special place in the law, that same-sex intimacy has
moral value equal to conjugal monogamy, and that same-sex intimacy is
of greater worth than non-marital relationships. By committing itself to
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at 48.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 50–51.
Id.
Id. at 51 (emphasis in original).
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these principles, the California high court abandoned moral neutrality on
the marriage question.
Like the Massachusetts SJC and the California Court of Appeal, a
majority of the California Supreme Court began its opinion by
declaiming its ostensible moral neutrality. It declared at the outset that
our task in this proceeding is not to decide whether we believe, as a
matter of policy, that the officially recognized relationship of a samesex couple should be designated a marriage rather than a domestic
partnership (or some other term), but instead only to determine whether
the difference in the official names of the relationships violates the
127
California Constitution.

The majority asserted its awareness of the ―very strongly held differences
of opinion . . . on the matter of policy.‖128 And the majority justices
dismissed as irrelevant their own ―views as individuals with regard to
this question . . . .‖129
Yet within several paragraphs, the court committed itself to the
morally partisan proposition that same-sex intimacy is entitled to the
same legal approbation accorded to conjugal monogamy.
One of the core elements of the right to establish an officially
recognized family that is embodied in the California constitutional right
to marry is a couple‘s right to have their family relationship accorded
dignity and respect equal to that accorded to other officially recognized
families, and assigning a different designation for the family
relationship of same-sex couples while reserving the historic
designation of ―marriage‖ exclusively for opposite-sex couples poses at
least a serious risk of denying the family relationship of same-sex
130
couples such equal dignity and respect.

The court asserted that California‘s statutory scheme harmed same-sex
couples and their children ―because denying such couples access to the
familiar and highly favored designation of marriage is likely to cast
doubt on whether the official family relationship of same-sex couples
enjoys dignity equal to that of opposite-sex couples.‖131 The court
expressed its concern that California‘s conjugal marriage law reflected
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 398–99 (emphasis original).
Id. at 399.
Id.
Id. at 400.
Id. at 401.
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the ―official view‖ that same-sex relationships ―are of lesser stature than
the comparable relationships of opposite-sex couples.‖132
The court asserted that a same-sex couple enjoys a fundamental right
―in having their family relationship accorded the same respect and
dignity enjoyed by an opposite-sex couple.‖133 Because the term
―marriage‖ is ―unreservedly approved and favored by the community,‖
the word has ―considerable and undeniable symbolic importance.‖134 The
court appropriated this approbation, favor, and symbolism for same-sex
intimacy. It thus promoted same-sex intimacy above non-marital
relationships, such as friendship and polygamy. And it did so in order to
advance its own ambitions for marriage, which were unrelated to
traditional purposes, such as unifying persons who are inherently
different and facilitating procreation.
California‘s marriage-domestic partnership scheme never withheld
respect or dignity from any individual heterosexual or homosexual. The
scheme did affirm the proposition that conjugal monogamy is
distinguishable from non-conjugal relationships on relevant, discernable
grounds. The court thought this distinction impermissible because the
law did not endorse the morally partisan proposition that same-sex
intimacy has moral worth equal to conjugal monogamy and thus must be
accorded dignity and respect.
After defining the fundamental right implicated, the court went on to
―conclude that although the provisions of the current domestic
partnership legislation afford same-sex couples most of the substantive
elements embodied in the constitutional right to marry,‖ California‘s
statutory scheme infringed a right enjoyed by intimate male-male
couples and female-female couples ―to marry under the California
Constitution.‖135 Curiously, the court made no attempt to explain why, on
this reasoning, polygamous groupings and non-sexually intimate couples
are as a matter of principle not also entitled to have their relationships
called ―marriage.‖ 136 Nor did it explain what is to be done with domestic
partners who are not involved in intimate same-sex relationships.
132. Id. at 402.
133. Id. at 401; see also id. at 445.
134. Id. at 445.
135. Id. at 401.
136. The court attempted to distinguish polygamous and incestuous relationships on the
prudential ground that such relationships have a ―potentially detrimental effect on a sound family
environment.‖ Id. at 434 n.52. Of course, any demonstration that a particular polygamous or
incestuous relationship (or several of them) constituted a healthy family environment would allay
this concern of the court. Indeed, the court rejected this very same type of argument in favor of
conjugal marriage when it disassociated conjugal marriage from procreation on the ground that some
conjugal couples are infertile or choose not to have children, yet are permitted to marry. Id. at 431–
32. The court tried to have it both ways; either generalized assertions about the social utility of
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Like the Massachusetts SJC, the California Supreme Court smuggled
into its autonomy and equality principles a perfectionist commitment to
granting the approbation of the law to same-sex intimacy. The court
asserted that the fundamental right to marry and the equal protection of
the law both require the State of California to approve of (accord
―respect‖ to) the choice of some persons to engage in homosexual
conduct. Respect for same-sex relationships generally, including malemale friendships or female-female business partnerships, is insufficient.
Instead, the state must affirm the value of intimate, same-sex conduct.
1. The court’s perfectionist autonomy analysis
Unlike the Massachusetts SJC, the California Supreme Court frontloaded its perfectionism. By inserting its moral claims into the definition
of the fundamental right to marry, the California Supreme Court
denigrated the traditional association between marriage and procreation,
and it gave marriage a new purpose, namely advancing individual,
personal fulfillment.
The court developed the elements of the fundamental right in several
stages, expanding its definition of the right by degrees, until at last the
court discerned in the California Constitution a right to require the state
to approve of one‘s intimate relationship with a member of the same sex.
In the first stage, the court began with ―the right of an individual to
establish a legally recognized family with the person of one‘s choice.‖137
This definition begs the central question whether marriage is inherently
conjugal. If, as the people of California supposed, marriage is a one-flesh
communion of a man and a woman, then the state is free to recognize
marriage in its traditional sense, while permitting each individual to
marry a member of the opposite sex of his or her own choosing. So, had
the court stopped here, it might have upheld the will of the people of
California.
However, the court continued to amend the right to marry. In the
second stage, after examining the ways in which marriage is beneficial to
individuals and society, the court added to the fundamental right the
―‗positive‘ right to have the state take at least some affirmative action to
acknowledge and support the family unit.‖138 Whatever form
acknowledgement and support take in the court‘s view, the right to marry
relational arrangements are permissible grounds for distinguishing between types relational
arrangements or they are not. In any event, the court cited no data for its generalized ascription of
detriment to polygamous arrangements.
137. Id. at 423.
138. Id. at 426.
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on this conception encompasses at least some official recognition by the
state. However, even this formulation does not lead to the court‘s
holding.139 If the court were morally neutral between competing
conceptions of ―the family unit,‖ the fundamental right would remain a
right to have state support of marriage as the state of California had
defined it, namely the union of a man and a woman.
So, the court took yet another step, altering the shape of the
fundamental right just one paragraph later. In the third stage, the
fundamental right appeared as an obligation of the state
to grant official, public recognition to the couple‘s relationship as a
family as well as to protect the core elements of the family relationship
from at least some types of improper interference by others . . . [and to
provide] assurance to each member of the relationship that the
government will enforce the mutual obligations between the partners
(and to their children) that are an important aspect of the commitments
140
upon which the relationship rests.

This formulation satisfied two predicates necessary to the creation of
same-sex marriage. First, for the first time, the right to marry includes
the right to receive from the State approbation for one‘s relationship, but
only if two people are involved in the relationship and those two people
are ―commit[ted]‖ to each other. With this language the court
distinguished two-person relationships from polygamy, polyandry, and
serial unions, effectively segregating same-sex intimacy from those
arrangements. However, it did not explain its reasoning for doing so.
Second, this definition of the right set the stage for the court‘s later
insertion of a morally partisan commitment to moral equivalence
between conjugal marriage and same-sex intimacy. By its reference to
the ―core elements of the family relationship,‖ the court prepared the
reader for its own declaration of which aspects of intimate relationships
constitute core elements and which are irrelevant to the right to receive
approbation from the state. By disposing of old ―core elements‖ and
adding new ones, the court was able to maintain the shell of marriage
while inserting its own perfectionist substance into that shell.
The court first tossed aside the core element of tradition. It ignored
the value that Anglo-American law has historically discerned in conjugal

139. Writing in dissent, Justice Baxter made this point, observing that none of the cases cited
by the majority ―holds, or remotely suggests, that any right to marry recognized by the Constitution
extends beyond the traditional definition of marriage to include same-sex partnerships.‖ Id. at 462
(Baxter, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 427 (George, C.J.) (citations omitted).
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marriage, asserting ―that history alone does not provide a justification for
interpreting the constitutional right to marry as protecting only one‘s
ability to enter into an officially recognized family relationship with a
person of the opposite sex.‖141 Then it dispensed with procreation and
conjugality as core elements of marriage on the ground that not all
conjugal couples produce children (though no same-sex couples can
produce children without the participation of a third person of the
opposite gender).142
Finally, the court placed within the shell of marriage new core
elements. ―Marriage,‖ the court assured the reader, is fundamentally a
relationship resting upon personal affections and advancing individual
fulfillment.143 Marriage promotes individual fulfillment by enriching the
personal lives of those who enter into it,144 providing a venue for
expressions of emotional support,145 and increasing happiness and wellbeing.146 Now the transformation of the fundamental right to marry was
complete. Freed of its attachment to tradition, conjugality, and
procreation, marriage became an institution capable of promoting the
loftiest end of constitutionally protected autonomy: individual, personal
fulfillment.
Thus, loaded with the court‘s polemical moral commitments and
freed from any association with childbearing and child rearing, the
fundamental right to marry again mutated. The right to marry in this
fourth stage ―guarantees same-sex couples the same substantive
constitutional rights as opposite-sex couples to choose one‘s life partner
and enter with that person into a committed, officially recognized, and
protected family relationship that enjoys all of the constitutionally based
incidents of marriage.‖147 From here it was a short step to ―the right of
same-sex couples to have their official family relationship accorded the
same dignity, respect, and stature as that accorded to all other officially
recognized family relationships.‖148
Thus, by incremental modulation, the court carefully shifted from a
morally neutral refrain to one containing an antipathy toward conjugal
marriage‘s privilege in law. The new definition of ―marriage‖ is
perfectionist in that it is loaded with and predicated upon the court‘s
moral conception of which aspects of marriage constitute ―core
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 430.
Id. at 431–32.
Id. at 432.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 424, 432.
Id. at 433.
Id. at 434.
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elements‖ and which ones can be disregarded. That conception values
affection and individual, personal fulfillment and disassociates
―marriage‖ from conjugality and procreation. On this basis the court
drew moral equivalence between conjugal marriage and same-sex
intimacy.
2. The court’s perfectionist equality analysis
The perfectionism in the court‘s equality analysis is even less subtle.
The court conceived an equality so gender-blind that it renders the selfevident differences between men and women irrelevant to the question of
how ―marriage‖ ought to be defined. It then used this conception of
equality to overturn California‘s definition of ―marriage.‖
The court agreed with the state attorney general ―that the provisions
of the Domestic Partner Act afford same-sex couples most of the
substantive attributes to which they are constitutionally entitled under the
state constitutional right to marry.‖149 Indeed, the court concluded that
the only distinction in California between domestic partnerships and
marriages is the designation, ―marriage.‖150 Nevertheless, according to
the court the ―historic and highly respected designation of marriage‖
must also be made available to same-sex couples so that their relational
arrangements may receive the moral approbation (―dignity and respect‖)
of the law.151 Otherwise, California law denies to same-sex couples equal
protection of the laws.152 This account of equality makes no sense if it is
not perfectionist.
As a threshold matter, the court rejected the argument in defense of
California‘s laws that same-sex couples and opposite-sex couples are not
similarly situated, and that equal protection analysis is thus unnecessary.
The court stated:
Both groups at issue consist of pairs of individuals who wish to
enter into a formal, legally binding and officially recognized, long-term
family relationship that affords the same rights and privileges and
imposes the same obligations and responsibilities. Under these
circumstances, there is no question but that these two categories of
individuals are sufficiently similar to bring into play equal protection

149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. at 435.
Id. at 398.
Id. at 434.
Id. at 445.
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principles that require a court to determine whether distinctions
153
between the two groups justify the unequal treatment.

This definition of the two groups‘ relevant interests is inapposite. If the
relevant interest in marriage is receipt of equal rights and imposition of
equal responsibilities, then the statutory scheme that the court struck
down was sufficient for equal protection purposes.
Furthermore, this analogy between the two groups is morally
partisan. The court prejudiced the comparison by emphasizing
similarities between the two groups that are relevant only if one first
commits to moral equivalence between conjugal marriage and same-sex
intimacy (and thus assumes the conclusion to be reached before
beginning one‘s analysis) and by ignoring relevant differences. The court
emphasized the putative value of pairing in ―long-term family
relationships,‖ the obvious common characteristic, and made no mention
of conjugality or procreation, two obvious points of distinction. Thus, the
court began with a commitment to a marriage institution divorced from
conjugality and procreation and founded solely upon the ability to have a
relationship.
The court again smuggled its moral commitments into its definition
of the suspect class. The court determined that ―sexual orientation‖ is a
suspect class and that California‘s law discriminated on the basis of
sexual orientation.154 The common response to this definition of the class
(in fact, the ground on which the court of appeal had rejected this
definition of the class) is that homosexuals, like heterosexuals, were free
to marry a member of the opposite sex under California‘s statutory
scheme. The court dismissed this response as ―sophistic . . . because
making such a choice would require the negation of the person‘s sexual
orientation.‖155 It posed a hypothetical statute that restricted marriage to
couples of the same sex and supposed that such a statute would
discriminate against heterosexuals on the basis of their sexual
orientation.156
The moral partisanship underlying this argument is the court‘s
commitment to the presupposition that gender doesn‘t matter. If relevant
differences between the sexes exist, as California‘s citizens appear to
believe, then the choice of conjugal marriage by both heterosexuals and
homosexuals has value. A man (for example) chooses something of

153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. at 435 n.54.
Id. at 442, 445.
Id. at 441.
Id.
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value when he chooses to marry a woman, and the substitution of a
second man for the woman does not reproduce that value.
Furthermore, the choice of conjugal marriage does not render a
homosexual‘s personal integrity nugatory, but defeats only the
homosexual‘s personal preference. One‘s preference for a member of the
same sex is relevant to the equality analysis of conjugal marriage only if
it does not matter whether one is joined in marriage to a member of the
opposite sex. Only by sequestering common sense observations about
gender from the equality analysis of marriage can one conclude that
equality entails same-sex marriage.
Put differently, equal access to conjugal marriage amounts to
sophistry only if one first adopts the morally partisan and controversial
claim that men and women are interchangeable in morally valuable,
intimate relationships. An individual who chooses to marry a member of
the opposite sex makes a choice that the common law has affirmed
throughout its history. In order for an individual man (for example) to
choose to marry a man rather than join with a woman, the state must first
endorse the proposition that a man can be substituted for a woman
without affecting the value of the marital union. That proposition, which
the California Supreme Court endorsed, is (to say the very least) not
neutral as between competing moral conceptions of the human person
and human sexuality. Had the court remained neutral on the moral
question whether the sexes are interchangeable, it would have left
California‘s marriage regime intact.
According to a slim majority of the California Supreme Court, it is
not enough to grant to same-sex couples all of the rights, benefits, and
obligations of marriage. Instead, the court required the State to extend
legal approbation to same-sex intimacy. It pre-loaded into its equality
analyses the moral claims that conjugal marriage is neither unique, nor
special, and that the sexes are interchangeable. The court assured the
residents of California that same-sex intimacy is, in fact, meaningful and
valuable in the same way and to the same degree as conjugal marriage. In
short, early on in its decision, a majority of the high court of California
abandoned any pretense of moral neutrality on the marriage question.
V. CONNECTICUT
The Connecticut Supreme Court, like the high courts of
Massachusetts and California, considered and rejected by a one-vote
margin a scheme that provided an institution (civil unions, in this case) in
which same-sex partners would enjoy and bear all of the rights,
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privileges, and responsibilities of marriage.157 Like the California and
Massachusetts courts, the Connecticut majority insisted that it was
maintaining a position of strict moral neutrality.158 It acknowledged,
―same sex marriage is a subject about which persons of good will
reasonably and sincerely disagree.‖159 Like the California high court, the
Connecticut court departed from this neutral position early in its
reasoning. It began its equal protection analysis by tossing out the
traditional purposes of marriage and substituting its own. It asserted that
the purposes of marriage are the sharing of a ―committed and loving
relationship‖ and ―having a family and raising their children.‖160 In this
way, the majority ―assume[d] that loving commitment between two
adults is the essence of marriage, even though the essence of marriage is
the very question at the heart of this case.‖161
Of course, as the court observed, same-sex couples have the same
interests in marriage for these purposes. So the court‘s morally-partisan
definition of the relevant purposes enabled the court to find that
Connecticut had denied to homosexual persons, as homosexual persons,
equal protection of the law. The Connecticut equal protection clause
compares persons who are similarly-situated ―for the purposes of the law
challenged.‖162 Because same-sex couples have the interest and capacity
to pursue the court‘s designated purposes for marriage, it did not matter
that the conduct they sought to engage in—‖marrying someone of the
same sex—is fundamentally different from‖ the conduct that had always
constituted the act of marriage.163 So the court‘s morally partisan
conception of marriage was essential to its preliminary finding that the
marriage statute implicated equal protection in the first instance.
Unlike the California court, the Connecticut court hid the mechanics
of its perfectionism. In a crucial footnote it dismissed the notion that
―same sex and opposite sex couples . . . are not similarly situated because
the former cannot engage in procreative sexual conduct.‖164 The fact that
same-sex couples cannot procreate did not, in the court‘s view, resolve
the question whether homosexuals and heterosexuals are similarly
situated ―for present purposes,‖ in other words, the purposes of
157. Kerrigan v. Comm’r Pub. Health, —A.2d—, 289 Conn. 135, 143 (Conn. 2008) (citing
Conn. Gen. Stat. §46b-38nn).
158. The Connecticut majority quoted directly the Massachusetts SJC‘s declamation that
moral considerations did not resolve the question before the court. Id. at 260–61.
159. Id. at 253 n.79.
160. Id. at 162.
161. Id. at 335 (Zarella, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 158.
163. Id. at 162.
164. Id. at 163 n.19.
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marriage.165 The real purposes of marriage, the majority insisted, were
only the homosexual individual‘s ―interest in having a family and the
same right to do so‖ that heterosexuals enjoy.166 This interest, shared by
homosexuals and heterosexuals alike, constituted ―the fundamental and
overriding similarit[y],‖ which rendered irrelevant ―the mere fact‖ that
same-sex couples cannot procreate without outside assistance.167 Here
the members of the majority expressly resorted to their personal beliefs.
The majority did not ―believe that [procreation] so defines the institution
of marriage that the inability to engage in that conduct is determinative‖
of the question of similar situation.168
Having determined that same-sex and conjugal couples are similarly
situated for the purposes of marriage that the court itself concocted, the
court went on to determine that homosexuals are a quasi-suspect class
under the Connecticut Constitution.169 Having identified a quasi-suspect
class, the court applied to the marriage-civil union scheme intermediate
scrutiny, requiring Connecticut to demonstrate that its law was
substantially related to an important governmental objective.170
Additionally, the court explained (again, in a footnote) that because of
the quasi-suspect classification, the state was not permitted to invoke all
relevant governmental interests but rather only those that ―actually
motivated the legislature‖ to distinguish between conjugal marriage and
civil unions.171 On this basis, the court declined to consider the reasons
for conjugal marriage articulated by various amici curiae and one of the
dissenting justices, Justice Zarella.
Justice Zarella in dissent noted that, far from discriminating against
homosexuals, the law of conjugal marriage simply takes no notice of
sexual orientation; Connecticut‘s marriage laws did not classify persons
on the basis of sexual orientation.172 He observed, ―The ancient definition
of marriage as the union of one man and one woman has its basis in
biology, not bigotry.‖173 Indeed, the ―long-standing, fundamental
purpose‖ of conjugal marriage, which the State of Connecticut had
always recognized (and had been known from ―ancient‖ times), ―is to
privilege and regulate procreative conduct.‖174 This was clear, Justice
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 165–251.
Id. at 251.
Id. at 253 n.79.
Id. at 325–26.
Id. at 323.
Id.

1]

THE SEARCH FOR MORAL NEUTRALITY

45

Zarella thought, from a review of our nation‘s long legal tradition.175
Zarella insisted upon judicial neutrality as between the people‘s
conception of the purpose of marriage the four-justice majority‘s
conception, and asserted, ―If the state no longer has an interest in the
regulation of procreation, then that is a decision for the legislature or the
people of the state and not this court.‖176
Justice Zarella identified other reasons for conjugal marriage, which
are subsidiary to and facilitative of the state‘s fundamental interest in
encouraging and regulating procreation. These include the ―regulation of
heterosexual behavior,‖ ordering the relationships in which procreation
takes place, and ensuring ―a stable family structure‖ for children.177
Zarella explained the relationship among these functions of conjugal
marriage.
The institution of marriage provides the important legal and normative
link between heterosexual intercourse and procreation on the one hand
and family responsibilities on the other. The partners in a marriage are
expected to engage in exclusive sexual relations, with children the
178
probable result and paternity presumed.

And, Zarella noted, Connecticut had long recognized that conjugal
marriage ―is necessary for the propagation of the species‖ and for the
―preservation and education‖ of the offspring of conjugal unions.179
The ―legal and normative [moral] link‖180 that Justice Zarella
identified between procreation and the state‘s regulation of procreative
relationships through civil marriage was served by two important
functions of conjugal marriage.
First, in order to advance society‘s interest in the survival of the human
race, the institution of marriage honors and privileges the only sexual
relationship – that between one man and one woman – that can result in
the birth of a child. Second, in order to protect the offspring of that
relationship and to ensure that society is not unduly burdened by
irresponsible procreation, marriage imposes obligations on the couple
181
to care for each other and for any resulting children.
175. Id. at 326–29. This tradition, of course, was only recently interrupted by one-vote
majority votes of three state high courts, all of which are discussed in this article.
176. Id. at 323.
177. Id. at 327.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 328–29.
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For all of these reasons, it was ―obvious‖ that the classification created
by conjugal marriage was based not on sexual orientation but rather ―on
a couple‘s ability to engage in sexual conduct of a type that may result in
the birth of a child.‖182
By refusing to consider any of these reasons for and purposes of
conjugal marriage, the Connecticut Supreme Court ensured that its
decision, and the four-justice majority opinion justifying that decision,
would be morally partisan. And by its unexplained insistence that the
only purposes of civil marriage are the individual‘s interest in sharing a
committed relationship and having a family, the majority became an
apologist for a controversial and novel, moral conception of marriage,
which directly contradicted the considered view of the people of
Connecticut and every other state. As Justice Zarella noted, the majority
assumed an answer to the very question it purported to answer.183
VI. A PERFECTIONIST CONCEPTION
That the decisions of the Massachusetts, California, and Connecticut
high courts are illogical if viewed as exercises in moral neutrality does
not mean that those decisions are incapable of a comprehensible reading.
Rather, the decisions can be read intelligibly if they contain an
unexpressed (and likely unexamined), prior commitment to a particular
moral principle, namely that same-sex intimacy has moral value equal to
the moral value of monogamous, conjugal intimacy.
Indeed, the most reasonable reading of the decisions is that
majorities of the courts assume that homosexual activity is a worthy end
or good, a moral reason for action. In this view, homosexual conduct
adds something of value to less-valuable, non-sexual same-sex
friendships, and thus ought to receive the encouragement and
approbation of the law. This assumption, if incorporated implicitly in the
Massachusetts, California, and Connecticut decisions, renders the courts‘
autonomy reasoning comprehensible.
This argument is not new. Carlos Ball, a same-sex marriage advocate
who understands himself to make a moral argument for same-sex
marriage, has long predicated his argument on the putative moral value
of homosexual intimacy. Ball attempts to ground an argument for samesex marriage on ―a recognition that same-sex relationships are

182. Id. at 329.
183. Id. at 335.

1]

THE SEARCH FOR MORAL NEUTRALITY

47

normatively valuable.‖184 It is insufficient, in Ball‘s view, to premise
arguments for same-sex marriage upon non-perfectionist liberalism.
Though Ball finds persuasive the non-perfectionist arguments that
homosexual-conduct advocates successfully employed against antisodomy laws, the push for legal recognition of same-sex marriage
―reflects a fundamental change in what many homosexuals are asking of
society.‖185 Non-perfectionist principles of equality and tolerance are,
Ball recognizes, ineffectual to bring about same-sex marriage. Political
liberalism ―must necessarily remain silent‖ on the justness of same-sex
marriage because legal approbation of homosexual relationships requires
―endors[ing] a particular conception of the good, and this political
liberalism cannot do.‖186
To illustrate the shortcomings of non-perfectionist liberalism, Ball
states that a ―political liberal, relying on notions of equality, tolerance,
and privacy, cannot satisfactorily respond to‖ the argument, commonly
asserted in defense of conjugal marriage, that a society that recognizes
same-sex marriages must also recognize polygamous marriages.187 Ball
observes that one can differentiate between or equate polygamous
relationships and homosexual relationships only ―by engaging in
normative assessments‖ of the respective values of each.188
Adumbrating the problem that the Massachusetts, California, and
Connecticut high courts would later face, Ball wrote, ―Gays and lesbians
are now asking that society fully recognize their relationships. They seek
not only eligibility for the receipt of the legal and financial benefits
associated with marriage, but also the normative acceptance of their
relationships.‖189 Ball supposed that, if homosexual-conduct advocates
were seeking for same-sex couples the benefits of marriage without the
label ―marriage‖ (if they sought civil unions or domestic partnerships, for
example), sentiments of equality might move the majority to accept that
proposal. But equality in access to benefits is insufficient for same-sex
couples ―because gays and lesbians currently seek not only equality in

184. Ball, supra note 16, at 1875. Ball‘s formulation is (no doubt unintentionally) misleading.
Recognizing the value of same-sex relationships, such as male-male friendships, entails neither
affirmation of the putative value of homosexual conduct nor equality in law between intimate, samesex relationships and conjugal marriage. Indeed this author is among those who both affirm the value
of same-sex friendship and oppose same-sex marriage. Ball is actually calling for approbation not of
same-sex relationships but rather of same-sex sexual intimacy.
185. Id. at 1874.
186. Id. at 1875.
187. Id. at 1878–79.
188. Id. at 1879.
189. Id. at 1876.
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the tangible benefits associated with marriage, but also full acceptance in
a normative sense.‖190
Ball considered and rejected both Rawlsian and Dworkinian, nonperfectionist liberalism as foundations for an argument of favor of samesex marriage.191 Both fail to account for the moral content requisite to
any argument in favor of same-sex marriage. Ball acknowledges that a
concession that homosexual acts are immoral or debasing would render
ineffectual the argument that ―society should condone that immorality by
recognizing gay marriages even if [as Rawls supposes] there is an
overlapping political consensus that toleration and equality should be
encouraged and promoted.‖192 The proposition that society has an
obligation to approve or reward immoral conduct does not follow from
the premise that a society must tolerate that conduct.
Similarly, Dworkin‘s prohibition against punishing someone for
leading the life he wants to lead does not mandate same-sex marriage;
recognition of conjugal marriage does not involve coercion or deprive
unmarried persons of their liberty. Ball recognizes the distinction that the
Massachusetts SJC majority glossed over: ―Society‘s refusal to recognize
same-sex marriage does not ‗forbid‘ gays and lesbians from leading the
lives they think are best for them; it instead entails withholding societal
approval of their relationships.‖193
For these reasons, Ball concludes, ―If our society is going to
recognize same-sex marriage, the supporters of such marriages must
incorporate perfectionist ideals into their arguments—they must be
prepared to speak not only in terms of individual rights, but also in terms
of collective goods and the moral value of same-sex relationships.‖194
The purpose of this article is neither to critique the merits of Ball‘s
argument nor to comment on its persuasiveness. Rather, it is helpful to
consider Ball‘s argument in light of the California and Massachusetts
courts‘ insistence that they were engaged upon a morally neutral project.
As Ball recognizes, changing the definition of marriage to include samesex relationships is an exercise about which non-perfectionist liberalism
has nothing to say.
Ball‘s argument provides an account of marriage that, when read into
the state same-sex marriage decisions, renders them comprehensible.
That the SJC understood and intended to play the role of moral teacher is
illustrated by its reasoning, as demonstrated in Part II, above. As
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id. at 1877 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 1883–1909.
Id. at 1893–94.
Id. at 1899.
Id. at 1881.
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demonstrated in Part III, the decisions make no sense as applications of
equality or autonomy principles. Similarly, as demonstrated in Part IV
above, the California court‘s reasoning does not hold together if stripped
of the court‘s prior antipathy toward a special status for conjugal
marriage. But when read as implicit endorsements of the proposition that
homosexual conduct is a worthy reason for action, the same-sex marriage
decisions make sense. If one begins, as Ball does, with the premise that
homosexual conduct has affirmative moral value, one can endorse the
additional proposition that homosexual conduct adds something of value
to a relationship between two persons of the same sex.195
Once one has accepted this presupposition, one can logically insist
that the law equally endorse and approve conjugal, monogamous
relationships and relationships defined by homosexual conduct.
However, a court that follows this reasoning has abandoned any moral
neutrality and has engaged in a perfectionist project, injecting into law
the controversial moral claims that (1) same-sex intimacy has positive
moral value and (2) conjugal marriage does not deserve the special place
in the law it once occupied.
VII. TWO RATIONAL BASES FOR STATES‘ CONJUGAL MARRIAGE LAWS
Two rational bases ground conjugal marriage laws.196 Both rational
basis arguments begin with the observation that different types of
relational arrangements—same-sex intimacy, non-sexual friendship,
conjugal monogamy, polygamy—are self-evidently distinguishable in
relevant ways. As Robert George has observed, ―Unless one embraces a
strict (and implausible) belief in androgyny, it is clear that [marriage
195. This author is among those who reject that premise. This is not to say that relationships
between persons of the same sex, including homosexual persons of the same sex, have no moral
value. It is only to say that homosexual conduct adds nothing of value to those relationships but
instead detracts from the integration of persons in a same-sex relationship by instrumentalizing the
human body. For more on this point, see Robert P. George & Gerard V. Bradley, Marriage and the
Liberal Imagination, in IN DEFENSE OF NATURAL LAW 139–60 (Robert P. George ed., Oxford Univ.
Press 1999); Patrick Lee & Robert P. George, What Sex Can Be: Alienation, Illusion, or One-Flesh
Union, 42 AM. J. JURIS. 135 (1997).
196. The California Supreme Court held, contra the Massachusetts SJC and the California
Court of Appeal, that conjugal marriage statutes discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation, a
suspect class under the California constitution, and that same-sex couples have a fundamental right
to receive the law‘s ―respect,‖ and for those reasons applied strict scrutiny review. In re Marriage
Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 400, 421 (Cal. 2008). As demonstrated in section IV.C.2 above, the premise of
the court‘s equal protection assertion is wrong. Conjugal marriage laws have exactly the same
application to homosexuals that they have to heterosexuals, permitting persons of all sexual
orientations to marry one person of the opposite sex who is not a close relative or a minor and not
married to a third person.
As for the fundamental right, the court gave no reason why this right should be limited to
same-sex couples, rather than polygamous and other groupings, and none appears in logic, as set
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between one man and one woman] is scarcely an arbitrarily drawn
class.‖197
The class of conjugal marriage is defined by readily discernable
features that bear rational relationships to both (1) particular moral goods
and (2) morally neutral societal benefits. For whatever reasons state
legislatures distinguish between same-sex and opposite-sex unions, the
capacity to make this distinction in law is itself a rational basis for the
traditional definition of marriage.
Justice Martha Sosman, writing in dissent, in Opinions of the
Justices,198 seemed to grasp this point. She chastised the majority for
requiring the legislature to give the statutory schemes for same-sex and
opposite-sex relational arrangements the same name ―even if the
statutory schemes are substantively different and those differences stem
from good and valid reasons.‖199 The majority of the California Court of
Appeal, in In re Marriage Cases, made an observation similar to this
when it reasoned that legislatures act rationally by defining the respective
rights and obligations appurtenant to different relational arrangements.200
This section of the article attempts to flesh out the differences that
legislatures rationally recognize between same-sex and conjugal
relationships.
A. A Morally Partisan Rational Basis for Conjugal Marriage Laws
A morally partisan rational basis for conjugal marriage begins with
the claim that conjugal marriage is a self-evidently basic good, joining as
it does a man and a woman in a one-flesh communion that is an intrinsic
reason for choice and action. This means that conjugal marriage is good
in and of itself, regardless of any extrinsic benefits that may or may not
result from being married. So, whether any particular marriage is useful
for procreation, support, affection, economy, love, pleasure, or even for
individual fulfillment (to borrow from the California Supreme Court),
human persons rationally choose to participate in conjugal marriage
forth in section IV.C above. However, the court extends the right only to same-sex couples. So the
definition of the right, in addition to being morally partisan, is internally inconsistent.
Because the bases for applying strict scrutiny are morally partisan and internally
inconsistent, this article will review conjugal marriage laws under the more sensible rational basis
standard.
197. Robert P. George, Marriage, Morality, and Rationality in THE MEANING OF MARRIAGE
142, 169 (Robert P. George & Jean Bethke Elshtain eds., Spence Publ. Comp. 2006) [hereinafter
Rationality].
198. Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 574–78 (Mass. 2004).
199. Id. at 578 n.4.
200. In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 675, 720 (Cal. App. 2006), rev’d 183 P.3d 384
(Cal. 2008).

1]

THE SEARCH FOR MORAL NEUTRALITY

51

when they choose it for its own sake. Gerard Bradley and Robert George
have made this defense of conjugal marriage. While morally partisan, in
the sense that it invokes a particular conception of goods and human
persons, this argument depends only on principles accessible through the
exercise of practical reason and is therefore rational.
Bradley and George argue that marriage, consisting of a two-in-oneflesh communion actualized by sexual acts of the reproductive type, is a
basic human good, like life, knowledge, and aesthetic experience.201 This
means that marriage is intrinsically good, in addition to being
instrumentally expedient.202 It is reasonably chosen not merely because it
enables participants to experience other goods, such as love, affection,
and child rearing, but also because it is good in and of itself; it is, in
George‘s words, ―a reason for acting whose intelligibility as a reason
depends on no ulterior end.‖203
The basic good of marriage is, according to Bradley and George,
actualized through conjugal sex acts of the reproductive type. Though
not all conjugal marital sex acts are reproductive in fact, because the
non-behavioral conditions of reproduction do not always pertain (as
where one or both of the spouses is infertile), the behavioral conditions
of reproduction, the bodily union of one man and one woman, are selfevidently part of marital union.204 For this reason, spouses have a basic
reason to perform conjugal acts.
By contrast, when people engage in sexual acts that do not actualize
the self-evident, basic good of marriage they treat the body as a mere
instrument for the pursuit of pleasure, affection, or some other end, and
thus damage personal integrity.205 Sex acts that are not reproductive in
type or do not take place within marriage are thus inconsistent with the
basic human good of integrity, regardless of the sexes or sexual
orientations of the persons participating in them.206
In other words, conjugal marital sex acts have special value and
meaning, which non-marital sex acts do not share. Note that the force of
this argument does not depend upon commitment to any particular
religious dogma. Rather, the argument follows from the self-evident
principle that conjugal marriage is a basic human good. This principle is

201. Robert P. George & Gerard V. Bradley, Marriage and the Liberal Imagination, 84 GEO.
L.J. 301, 301–02 (1995) [hereinafter Liberal Imagination].
202. Id. at 302.
203. Rationality, supra note 197, at 153.
204. Id. at 157–65, 168.
205. Liberal Imagination, supra note 201, at 302.
206. Id.
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grasped through non-inferential acts of understanding and may be tested
through dialectical argument.207
Because this defense of marriage begins with an invocation of selfevidence, it has met the criticism that it is circular and conclusory, and
thus irrational. For example, Dale Carpenter, a critic of conjugal
marriage, asserts that Bradley‘s and George‘s defense of conjugal
marriage ―suffers a fatal circularity.‖208 He faults them for their candid
reliance upon a self-evident principle, which must be grasped, if at all, in
non-inferential acts of reasoning. He concludes that Bradley and George
are guilty of ―because-I-say-so reasoning,‖ which constitutes a ―bad
argument.‖209
If Bradley and George offered only their own ipse dixit, as Carpenter
supposes, then their argument would indeed be bad. However, Carpenter
pummels a straw man. That Bradley and George make a self-evident
observation neither defeats the rationality of their argument nor renders it
circular. Reliance upon self-evident principles is neither new nor
irrational. The law depends upon numerous self-evident premises
without thereby defeating its logic; every argument has to start
somewhere. By starting with a principle grasped through non-inferential
acts of reasoning, Bradley and George offer a clear starting point, from
which a straight line departs.
Proponents of same-sex marriage may disagree with the claim that
the intrinsic value of conjugal marriage is self-evident. Indeed, many of
them seem to assume that marital sex is self-evidently not unique.210
Carpenter himself takes as an unexamined first principle that conjugal
acts are not morally significant. Carpenter‘s conclusion requires
commitment either to the presupposition that consensual sex is morally
indistinguishable from consensual arm wrestling or to the presupposition
that same-sex intimacy is equally as morally valuable as conjugal
207. Id. at 307.
208. Dale Carpenter, Bad Arguments Against Gay Marriage, 7 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 181,
190 (2005).
209. Id. at 189.
210. In fact, it is proponents of same-sex marriage who make circular arguments predicated
upon ipse dixit. The equality argument for same-sex marriage (for example) depends upon
establishment of the proposition that choice of a partner of the same sex is the only valuable choice
for a homosexual person. However, same-sex marriage advocates have made no attempt to
demonstrate this point. In fact, this presupposition follows only from their ultimate conclusion,
namely that same-sex intimacy is equally as morally valuable as conjugal monogamy.
The California Supreme Court made this same circular argument while trying to establish
that conjugal marriage laws treat homosexuals differently than heterosexuals. Rather than identify a
way in which the law discriminated in intent or effect, the court asserted baldly, ―By definition, gay
individuals are persons who are sexually attracted to persons of the same sex and thus, if inclined to
enter into a marriage relationship, would choose to marry a person of their own sex or gender.‖ In re
Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 441 (Cal. 2008).
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monogamy. Carpenter does not provide an account of his reasoning on
this point.
Regardless, this disagreement on first principles does not defeat the
moral rational basis for conjugal marriage. As the California Court of
Appeal recognized, it is not up to courts to choose between competing
conceptions of human goods where the people have done so either
through their elected representatives or through direct lawmaking.
Carpenter also characterizes Bradley‘s and George‘s argument as
irrational on the much-abused ground that sterile and elderly couples are
allowed to marry, and homosexual couples are indistinguishable from
these couples in terms of their ability to procreate.211 However, the
argument for conjugal marriage is predicated neither upon a requirement
that all marriages produce children nor upon an assumption that all
marriages will do so.
In Bradley‘s and George‘s view, marital sex is not an instrumental
good but rather a constituent aspect of the basic good of marriage.
Marital sex has special value, irrespective of the fertility of the married
persons. Indeed, Bradley and George expressly reject the view that sex
can properly be considered a mere means to any extrinsic end, whether
that end is procreation, pleasure, or friendship.212 So, this argument for
conjugal marriage runs in the opposite direction of Carpenter‘s
characterization of it.213
As Bradley and George demonstrate, one can grasp through the
exercise of reason the unique moral value of conjugal monogamy. If a
state legislature accepts the claim that conjugal marriage is a basic good,
then that legislature may rationally lend to conjugal marriage special
approbation in law, granting to conjugal marriage its own unique civil
institution. The legal recognition of that institution might encourage and
incentivize participation in it. Legislatures thus act rationally by lending
the approbation of law to conjugal marriage on the ground that conjugal
marriage is a morally valuable relational arrangement, which promotes
human flourishing. Whether or not courts agree with this moral
argument, it is rational and thus sufficient to support the defense of
conjugal marriage from equal protection and due process challenges.

211. Carpenter, supra note 208 at 194–95.
212. Liberal Imagination, supra note 201, at 305.
213. Id. at 305–06.
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B. A Morally Neutral Rational Basis for Conjugal Marriage Laws
A morally neutral rational basis for upholding conjugal marriage
laws is the capacity to distinguish in law between relational arrangements
that are self-evidently distinguishable in relevant ways in fact.
Legislatures rationally distinguish between man-woman monogamy,
man-man intimacy, man-woman-woman polygamy, woman-man-man
polyandry, man-boy pedophilia, and other intimate arrangements on the
ground that different relational arrangements have differing levels and
types of instrumental values to an ordered society.214
States might rationally classify relational arrangements for both
morally partisan and morally neutral reasons. Even if Bradley and
George are incorrect in their claim that the two-in-one-flesh union of a
man and a woman has intrinsic value, different relational arrangements
serve different extrinsic values for individuals and the societies in which
they participate. Legal distinctions between and among institutions such
as marriage, civil unions, and domestic partnerships enable legislators
and citizens to identify and protect the relative instrumental values in
different relational arrangements. On this ground states may rationally
call male-female monogamy by one name, same-sex intimacy by
another, polygamy by a third name, and non-sexual supportive
relationships (i.e. a daughter caring for an elderly mother) by a fourth
name. Each legal institution corresponds to a different relational
arrangement, and each relational arrangement is useful to society for
different purposes.
Same-sex marriage advocates make a similar point when they argue
(unpersuasively, in the view of some)215 that same-sex marriage is
distinguishable from polygamous marriage. Whether or not same-sex
intimacy has greater moral value than polygamy, same-sex marriage
advocates and the California Supreme Court claim to discern relevant
distinctions between the two relationships in terms of their social utility.
In their view, one supposes, these distinctions would serve as a rational
basis for prohibiting polygamy while recognizing same-sex ―marriages.‖
Not all prudential distinctions between relational arrangements must
imply superiority of one arrangement over another. Legislatures might
214. Of course it is true, as the Connecticut court noted, that a classification ―cannot be
maintained merely for its own sake.‖ Kerrigan v. Comm’r Pub. Health, —A.2d—, 289 Conn. 135,
255 (Conn. 2008). However, legislatures do not distinguish between relationships in positive law
merely for the purpose of distinguishing between relationships in positive law. Instead, they do so to
reflect actual distinctions that appear between relationships in reality, and in order to classify those
distinctions according to their (1) moral value and (2) social utility.
215. See Hadley Arkes, The Family and the Laws, in THE MEANING OF MARRIAGE 125–27,
138–39 (Robert P. George & Jean Bethke Elshtain eds., Spence Publ. Comp. 2006).
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rationally distinguish between relationships according to the types, as
well as the degrees, of social uses they produce. A legislature may
determine that some relationships are valuable for some purposes, while
other relationships are valuable for other purposes, and arrange its
institutions so as to incentivize the most useful aspects of each type of
relationship.
To be sure, a state legislature is entitled to determine which intimate
relationships are instrumentally valuable, and thus deserving of
institutional recognition, and which ones are less useful and thus not
deserving of their own institutions or deserving of more limited
institutional recognition. However, state legislatures might additionally
and rationally separate institutions not merely hierarchically along one
axis but also in a matrix based upon a number of prudential factors. They
might, for example, determine that non-sexual, same-sex relationships
are beneficial for the promotion of friendship, while same-family
pairings, such as mother-father or nephew-uncle, are useful for financial
and emotional support. They could, based upon these findings, rationally
establish different institutions for those types of relational arrangements.
The distinction between those institutions would imply no moral or
prudential superiority of one over the other. The potential axes are
numerous. Legislatures might rationally distinguish between different
types of erotic relationships, between different types of non-sexual
relationships, and might distinguish erotic relationships from non-sexual
relationships.
A state legislature might determine that conjugal marriage is
valuable to the State because, among other reasons, it is the best
institution for the breeding and rearing of children.216 For this reason,

216. Justice Zarella noted Connecticut‘s legitimate interest ―in promoting and regulating
procreative conduct.‖ Zarella dissent, at 9. Conjugal marriage, he observed, is rationally related to
that interest for at least three reasons. Id. First, the state might rationally conclude that ―biological
ties‖ make conjugal families more stable environments for child-rearing. Id. ―Second, and relatedly,
the state rationally could conclude that children do best when they are raised by a mother and a
father, a belief that finds great support in life experience and common sense.‖ Id. ―Third, the benefits
and social status associated with traditional marriage encourage men and women to enter into a state,
namely, long-term, mutually supported cohabitation, that is conducive both to procreation and
responsible child rearing on the part of the biological parents.‖ Id.
Maggie Gallagher, an expert in these matters, after reviewing relevant social science
studies concluded:
Marriage has powerful benefits for children and communities. When parents get and stay
married, children do better in every way that social scientists know how to measure,
provided those marriages are not high-conflict or violent. Communities benefit from
more productive, law-abiding citizens, more orderly schools and neighborhoods, and
fewer troubling and expensive social problems.
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California might afford to conjugal marriages tax breaks and other
privileges related to stability of intimate, opposite-sex relationships and
the raising of children. At the same time, California might create a
separate institution for adult offspring and their ailing parents, who
reside together for convenience of care and support, endowing that
relational arrangement with certain rights and privileges helpful to one
trying to care for an elderly or ailing parent. This institution might serve
the prudential purpose of reducing the State‘s health care costs. And the
state might create a third institution for same-sex friendship, which the
California Supreme Court thought beneficial to an individual‘s happiness
and well-being.217 The distinction between these institutions would bear a
rational relationship to legitimate state interests.
That conjugal marriage distinguishes between genders does not
render it irrational. Indeed, many laws necessarily distinguish between
genders in order to reflect self-evident gender differences. For example,
the state has a legitimate interest in determining the paternity of children.
As Justice Sosman pointed out in Opinions of the Justices the
presumption of paternity
reflects reality with respect to an overwhelming majority of those
children born of a woman who is married to a man. As to same-sex
couples, however, who cannot conceive and bear children without the
aid of a third party, the presumption is, in every case, a physical and
218
biological impossibility.

Justice Sosman thought this difficulty not insuperable; ―substantial
modification[s]‖ to the laws concerning parenthood could make sense of
the application of those laws to same-sex unions.219 However, a
moment‘s reflection reveals that this is not the case. The paternity
presumption (to stay with that example) is designed around a biological
fact, that women give birth. Because of this fact, mothers are easily
identifiable while fathers, in cases of fornication and infidelity, are not.
As Justice Sosman rightly pointed out, same-sex couples cannot bear
children without the aid of a third party. Where that third party is a
woman assisting two men in a male-male relationship, the presumption
of paternity will not pertain, and the law will need some other

Maggie Gallagher, (How) Does Marriage Protect Child Well-Being?, in THE MEANING OF
MARRIAGE 197–212, 212 (Robert P. George & Jean Bethke Elshtain eds., Spence Publ. Comp.
2006) [hereinafter Child Well-Being].
217. Id. at 59.
218. Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 577 n.3 (Mass. 2004).
219. Id.
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mechanism for determining parenthood. Where the third party is a male
assisting two women in a female-female relationship, the third party
male will not qualify for the paternity presumption and paternity will
remain unresolved.
It is useful to note how closely these hypotheticals resemble
polygamy and polyandry. Indeed, for same-sex couples to procreate, they
necessarily must cooperate with at least one additional partner, and in
this sense their relationships resemble plural marriages. This further
underscores the morally neutral rational basis for conjugal marriage laws.
Any legal regime that bestows intimate same-sex relationships with some
institutional recognition will necessarily have to distinguish those
relationships both from conjugal monogamy and from polygamy and
polyandry. Indeed, it will be necessary to do so not just with respect to
paternity, but for other purposes as well. As long as polygamy remains
prohibited, the state will need some mechanism for distinguishing thirdparty participation in same-sex non-marital procreation (as in the cases
discussed above) from third-party participation in marriage.
Health insurance providers that provide coverage for families may
find it necessary to distinguish between families in which both parents
present male-specific health risks, those in which both parents present
female-specific health risks, and those that contain some combination.
The state might rationally identify those families in which children are
raised by adults who did not conceive them, such as polygamous
families, same-sex arrangements, second-marriage homes, and foster
families.220 Other variations on this theme will occur to the imaginative
reader. For these reasons, state legislatures may rationally distinguish
different relational arrangements from each other.
Legislatures may rationally acknowledge different characteristics
and instrumental values inherent in certain relationships that other
relationships do not share. When legislatures acknowledge these
differences in law, they do so for non-moral reasons. States might
rationally distinguish between conjugal marriage and same-sex domestic
partnerships on the ground that conjugal marriages have, on the whole,
demonstrated throughout history their social utility, while same-sex
partnerships have not yet done so.221 On this rational basis, unrelated to
220. Don Browning and Elizabeth Marquardt, two liberals who understand themselves to
propose a ―progressive‖ understanding of marriage, have discussed the societal benefits of ―kin
altruism,‖ the phenomenon that natural parents are inclined to feel special affection for, and thus
provide care to, the children whom they conceived. Don Browning & Elizabeth Marquardt, What
About the Children? Liberal Cautions on Same-Sex Marriage, in THE MEANING OF MARRIAGE 29–
52 (Robert P. George & Jean Bethke Elshtain eds., Spence Publ. Comp. 2006).
221. Justice Zarella noted in his dissent from the Connecticut decision that the societal
implication of same-sex marriage, particularly for child-rearing, will not be known for some time
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the relative moral worth of these two types of relationships, California
(for example) might have given same-sex partnerships provisional
recognition, to enable them to demonstrate their instrumental worth, as
conjugal marriages have done. Alternatively, states might determine after
experience and study that conjugal marriage instrumentally produces
extrinsic benefits that other relational arrangements do not generate.222
This also would constitute a morally neutral rational basis for according
to conjugal marriage a special status in the law.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In the view of the majorities of the Massachusetts, California, and
Connecticut high courts, the law must affirm that gender does not matter,
that conjugal marital relationships are not special, and that intimate,
same-sex relationships are deserving of special approbation in a way that
non-marital relationships are not. These claims are not nearly as
uncontroversial as many seem to suppose, and they certainly are not
morally neutral. The courts‘ arguments are morally partisan because they
promote a particular conception of human sexuality and the good. The
claim that homosexual conduct is equally as good or worthy as conjugal
marital sexual conduct is a moral claim because it entails a necessarily
moral conception of the good and the worthy.
That most people have treated the Massachusetts same-sex marriage
decisions as morally neutral is perhaps a central reason why much of the
debate over the justness of the decisions has generated more heat than
light. Notwithstanding the non-perfectionist rhetoric so prominent in
Goodridge, no morally neutral defense of the SJC‘s marriage decisions,
taken together, is possible because the decisions are not themselves
morally neutral. The majority‘s ruling in Opinions of the Justices and the
reasoning that the majority employed both foreclose any reasonable
reading of the same-sex marriage decisions that is consistent with a

into the future. Kerrigan v. Comm’r Pub. Health, —A.2d—, 289 Conn. 135, 344 (Conn. 2008).
―Thus, it is entirely reasonable for the state to be cautious about implementing genderless marriage,
the long-term effects of which cannot be known beforehand with any degree of certainty.‖ Id.
222. In fact, studies support this conclusion. Maggie Gallagher, (How) Will Gay Marriage
Weaken Marriage as a Social Institution: A Reply to Andrew Koppelman, 2 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 33,
46–51 (2004).
While scholars continue to disagree about the size of the marital advantage and the
mechanisms by which it is conferred, the weight of social science evidence strongly
supports the idea that family structure matters and that the family structure that is most
protective of child well-being is the intact, biological, married family.
Child Well-Being, supra note 216, at 200. See also Browning & Marquardt, supra note 220, at 46.
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commitment to moral neutrality. For similar reasons, the California
Supreme Court‘s reasoning in In re Marriage Cases and the Connecticut
Supreme Court‘s decision in Kerrigan are incapable of a morally neutral
reading.
Because the same-sex marriage rulings are not morally neutral, one
trying to defend the decisions as just must engage his or her opponents
on moral grounds. Predicating the rulings are implicit resolutions of the
fundamentally moral questions: (1) whether conjugal marriage has
special value, and (2) whether homosexual intimacy is a worthy human
end (moral) or rather an act inconsistent with integral human fulfillment
and unworthy of persons who engage in it (immoral). On these grounds,
and on these grounds alone, will further debate prove fruitful.
Nevertheless, though ultimate resolution of the merits of same-sex
marriage (in legislatures and other democratic fora) must turn on the
underlying moral dispute, there remain two rational bases for upholding
conjugal marriage laws against judicial challenges. The first rational
basis is morally partisan, but derives from the self-evident principle,
accessed through the exercise of practical reason, that conjugal marriage
has intrinsic value, and is thus in itself a basic reason for human choice
and action.
The second rational basis is morally neutral in the sense that it does
not depend upon any prior commitment to a particular conception of the
human person or human sexuality. Instead, it derives from the selfevident observation that different relational arrangements display
different characteristics and produce different social benefits. On this
ground, states rationally distinguish between conjugal marriage and other
relationships and retain for conjugal marriage a special status in the law.

